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I Get By with a Little Help from My 750-Dollar-
Per-Tablet Friends: A Model Act for States to 
Prevent Dramatic Pharmaceutical Price 
Increases 
Alexander Walsdorf∗ 
Imagine being a low-income worker in poverty or living 
paycheck to paycheck.1 Maybe you are an independent contrac-
tor or flex employee and have no job security. Perhaps you have 
no savings or emergency funds to reach into if the unexpected 
happens. Now, further imagine having HIV/AIDS and needing 
medication to prevent and treat fatal parasitic infections. This 
medication is far from cheap, costing $13.50 per pill at whole-
sale. Your insurance—assuming you have it—covers most of the 
cost, but you still are left to pay a certain amount of out-of-pocket 
costs. What would you do if the price of that medication skyrock-
eted over 5000% to now cost $750 per pill? 
When Turing Pharmaceuticals acquired the U.S. marketing 
rights for Daraprim, a drug that, among many other uses, pre-
vents parasitic infections such as toxoplasmosis in people living 
with HIV/AIDS, this nightmarish scenario became a reality for 
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 1. As of 2015, there were 43.1 million people living in poverty in the 
United States. BERNADETTE D. PROCTOR ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME 
AND POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES: 2015 at 12 (Sept. 2016), http:// 
www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2016/demo/p60 
-256.pdf. 
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many.2 The Turing case is just one example of a decades-long 
practice of dramatic—some would say predatory—price in-
creases of various lifesaving drugs in the pharmaceutical indus-
try.3 Regardless of whether these price hikes are morally repug-
nant, they are perfectly legal. Further, the expense of 
researching, developing, and bringing drugs to market requires 
and justifies subsequent high retail costs.4 If pharmaceutical 
companies will not profit from their efforts, why should they 
bother at all? 
Federal law not only permits dramatic price increases in 
pharmaceuticals, but effectively aids pharmaceutical companies 
in doing so. Through the interplay between federal intellectual 
property and antitrust law, pharmaceutical companies have 
wide latitude to price their drugs as they see fit. Patent and in-
tellectual property law promotes innovation,5 which is realized 
by granting the inventor or patent holder a limited monopoly.6 
 
 2. For more information on Turing Pharmaceuticals’ acquisition of Dara-
prim, and its notorious ex-CEO Martin Shkreli, see Anna Almendrala, What the 
Daraprim Price Hike Actually Does to Health Care, HUFFPOST (Sept. 23, 
2015), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/daraprim-price-turing-shkreli_ 
us_560063cee4b00310edf82060. 
 3. Another example of dramatic price increases is Mylan’s increase of the 
price of its EpiPen, an autoinjector to be used immediately after an allergic 
emergency. Mylan increased the price of an EpiPen two-pack from $100 in 2009 
to more than $600 in 2016. For more background information on EpiPen’s price 
hike, see Nathan Bomey, 5 Things We Learned from EpiPen Price Hike Hearing, 
USA TODAY (Sept. 22, 2016), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2016/09/ 
22/epipen-congress-hearing-mylan/90827270; see also Anne Harding, 6 Insane 
Examples of Prescription Drug Price Increases, HEALTH.COM (Sept. 25, 2015), 
http://www.health.com/mind-body/6-insane-examples-of-prescription-drug 
-price-increases. 
 4. Estimates suggest it costs on average $2.6 billion to bring a drug to 
market. Cost to Develop and Win Marketing Approval for a New Drug Is $2.6 
Billion, TUFTS CTR. FOR STUDY DRUG DEV. (Nov. 18, 2014), http://csdd.tufts 
.edu/news/complete_story/pr_tufts_csdd_2014_cost_study [hereinafter TUFTS 
CTR.]. Contra Jason Millman, Does It Really Cost $2.6 Billion to Develop a New 
Drug?, WASH. POST (Nov. 18, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/ 
wonk/wp/2014/11/18/does-it-really-cost-2-6-billion-to-develop-a-new-drug (com-
piling various studies on how much it costs to bring a drug to market, the largest 
estimate being five billion dollars). 
 5. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. Known as the Copyright Clause, this section of 
the U.S. Constitution authorizes Congress “[t]o promote the Progress of Science 
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the 
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” Id.  
 6. Stephan Kinsella, “The” Purpose of Patent Law, CTR. FOR STUDY INNO-
VATIVE FREEDOM (Dec. 6, 2010), http://c4sif.org/2010/12/the-purpose-of-patent 
-law. 
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However, granting limited monopolies contradicts the com-
monsense notion that antitrust law should regulate the conduct 
of businesses and promote fair competition for the benefit of con-
sumers.7 Consumers do not benefit when they have to pay more 
than 5000% more per pill for a lifesaving prescription drug than 
they did two years ago. 
Little has been done—or even proposed—to prevent dra-
matic price increases for prescription drugs. Meanwhile, the few 
safeguards that do exist have had little success. The Hatch-Wax-
man Act, which was designed to ensure generic competition of 
pharmaceutical drugs with their brand-name counterparts, has 
only had limited success.8 Some state governments have at-
tempted to increase generic competition through enactment of 
their own competition laws or have attempted to directly regu-
late the sales price of patented drugs;9 the Supremacy Clause 
and preemption by the Patent Act often prohibits such efforts. 
Lastly, while politicians at the federal level have proposed legis-
lation to prohibit price increases of pharmaceutical drugs, no 
meaningful legislation has come to pass.10 
What can be done to prevent dramatic price increases in the 
pharmaceutical industry? This Note provides an answer in light 
of the absence of meaningful options.11 Part I of this Note dis-
cusses the economics of the pharmaceutical industry and how 
patent law protects economic interests. It then explores the ex-
isting mechanisms in place designed to keep the price of phar-
maceuticals low, including the Hatch-Waxman Act and antitrust 
scrutiny by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and Congress. 
It also examines the various proposals presented by federal and 
state legislators to control soaring pharmaceutical prices. Part 
II addresses the pitfalls of various federal proposals to control 
rising drug prices and also explains why Patent Act preemption 
constrains states from regulating drug pricing. Part III advo-
cates for states to adopt this Note’s proposed Model Act—or some 
variation of it—which would allow states to directly prohibit and 
 
 7. See Guide to Antitrust Laws, FTC, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/ 
competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws (last visited June 18, 2018). 
 8. See, e.g., Aaron S. Kesselheim & Jonathan J. Darrow, Hatch-Waxman 
Turns 30: Do We Need a Re-Designed Approach for the Modern Era?, 15 YALE J. 
HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 293, 319 (2015). 
 9. See infra Part II.A.2. 
 10. See infra Part I.B. 
 11. President Trump has signaled his willingness to reduce the prices of 
pharmaceutical drugs. It seems unlikely he would accomplish this feat without 
congressional support, however, which to date has yet to appear. 
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regulate dramatic price increases of pharmaceutical products. 
Part IV addresses counterarguments and concerns about the le-
gality and possible preemption of this Note’s proposed Model 
Act. Ultimately, this Note illustrates the need for a carefully 
crafted solution to rectify dramatic pharmaceutical price in-
creases. It proposes legislation that addresses the problem in a 
way that conforms with existing federal and state law. 
I.  THE UNITED STATES’ EMPHASIS ON PATENT 
PROTECTION FOR DRUG DEVELOPMENT   
Despite various intervention and enforcement mechanisms 
and the recent influx of regulatory proposals, dramatic pharma-
ceutical price increases have occurred for decades.12 The cost of 
researching, developing, and bringing a new drug to market in-
centivizes pharmaceutical companies to exploit their patents 
and set prices however they see fit. Section A briefly addresses 
the high cost of drug development. Section B discusses the roles 
of federal patent and antitrust laws to protect the economic in-
terests of the pharmaceutical industry. Section C discusses the 
Hatch-Waxman Act, a federal mechanism to reduce drug prices 
by increasing generic competition with name-brand drugs. Fi-
nally, Section D examines a variety of other proposals designed 
to control soaring drug prices. 
A. A PRECURSOR TO PHARMACEUTICAL PRICING: THE MASSIVE 
PRICE TAG AND RISK OF DRUG DEVELOPMENT 
Estimates vary on how much it costs to develop and bring a 
new pharmaceutical drug to market. One estimate predicts it 
costs anywhere between five-hundred million dollars and two 
billion dollars,13 while others predict it can cost anywhere be-
tween $2.5 billion14 and five billion dollars.15 Without needing to 
 
 12. Competitive Problems in the Pharmaceutical Drug Industry: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Monopolies & Bus. Rights of the S. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 1–2 (1987) (demonstrating that price increases in 
the pharmaceutical industry have occurred since, at least, the mid-to late-
1980s, giving Congress at least thirty years to enact legislation preventing such 
occurrences). 
 13. A study conducted by the FTC found that drug development cost $521 
million for one large drug manufacturer, while it cost over $2 billion for another. 
Christopher P. Adams & Van V. Brantner, Estimating the Cost of New Drug 
Development: Is It Really $802 Million?, 25 HEALTH AFFAIRS 420, 427 (2006). 
 14. See TUFTS CTR., supra note 4. 
 15. Matthew Herper, The Cost of Creating a New Drug Now $5 Billion, 
Pushing Big Pharma to Change, FORBES (Aug. 11, 2013), https://www.forbes 
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settle on a specific dollar amount, it is universally agreed that 
new drug development requires huge sums of capital to research, 
develop, and bring a drug to market.16 
The risks of bringing a new drug to market increase its costs. 
A compilation of the Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) drug 
development and approval process found that the overall proba-
bility of success of a new pharmaceutical drug being approved by 
the FDA was a mere eight percent.17 That same compilation 
found that it took, on average, 7.6 to 19 years to research, de-
velop, receive FDA approval, and bring a drug to market.18 Some 
may argue the need to recoup the investment, in addition to 
earning a profit in this risky endeavor, justifies pharmaceutical 
price tags. 
B. FEDERAL MECHANISMS TO PROTECT THE ECONOMIC 
INTERESTS OF DRUG DEVELOPMENT 
Federal law protects drug developers’ economic interests in 
new drug development. This Section explores how the Patent Act 
and federal antitrust law operate to keep the price tag of phar-
maceuticals high. Part IV discusses these principles specifically 
as they apply to the proposed Model Act. 
1. The Patent Act 
Enacted in 1790,19 the Patent Act20 benefits the public and 
protects inventors by encouraging inventors to disclose new tech-
nology in return for a limited-duration monopoly on their intel-
lectual property.21 The limited-duration monopoly lasts for a pe-




 16. See Millman, supra note 4 (explaining that a $2.6 billion price tag on a 
new drug development is a fair estimate). 
 17. The Drug Development and Approval Process, INDEPENDENT INST., 
http://fdareview.org/03_drug_development.php (last visited June 18, 2018). 
 18. Id. 
 19. The U.S. Patent System Celebrates 212 Years, U.S. PATENT & TRADE-
MARK OFFICE (Apr. 9, 2002), https://www.uspto.gov/about-us/news-updates/us 
-patent-system-celebrates-212-years. 
 20. 35 U.S.C. §§ 1–376 (2012).  
 21. See Chandra Nath Saha & Sanjib Bhattacharya, Intellectual Property 
Rights: An Overview and Implications in Pharmaceutical Industry, 2 J. AD-
VANCED PHARMACEUTICAL TECH. & RES. 88, 88 (2011) (“Intellectual property 
rights (IPR) have been defined as ideas, inventions, and creative expressions 
based on which there is a public willingness to bestow the status of property. 
IPR provide certain exclusive rights to the inventors or creators of that property, 
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it enters the public domain, free for anyone to use.22 Patent law 
promotes progress in science and technology. To obtain a patent, 
the scientific discovery or technology must be new,23 useful,24 
and nonobvious.25 Obtaining a patent on new technology “in-
volves the discovery of scientific knowledge and technical know-
how, as well as the development of products and processes that 
are conceptually new.”26 
The Patent Act plays an integral role in the pricing of phar-
maceuticals. Pharmaceutical patent holders—and patent seek-
ers—argue that patent law should protect their interests in new 
drug developments that meet the new, useful, and nonobvious 
requirements.27 The claim is that the law should protect those 
companies who need to recoup the high cost of drug development 
by allowing them to charge high prices during the period they 
hold effective monopolies.28 Without patent protection, anyone 
could use and profit from new drugs without having to spend the 
money or incur the risk that drug development entails.29 This 
could lead to a collective-action problem, as few companies would 
invest millions or billions of dollars over a period of 7.6 to 19 
years without having patent protection preventing others from 
piggybacking on their efforts. 
 
in order to enable them to reap commercial benefits from their creative efforts 
or reputation.”). While patents, trademarks, and copyrights are included under 
the umbrella term of intellectual property, this Note will focus primarily on pa-
tents and their implication in the pharmaceutical industry. 
 22. 35 U.S.C. § 154. 
 23. Id. § 102. 
 24. Id. § 101. 
 25. Id. § 103. 
 26. Tallam I. Nguti, Patent Law: Doctrinal Stability—A Research and De-
velopment Definition of Invention Is Key, 20 VAL. U. L. REV. 653, 654 (1986). 
 27. See Alison Kodjak, Tighter Patent Rules Could Help Lower Drug Prices, 
Study Shows, NPR (Aug. 23, 2016), https://www.npr.org/sections/health 
-shots/2016/08/23/491053523/tighter-patent-rules-could-help-lower-drug-prices 
-study-shows (“Companies spend billions of dollars researching drugs and ush-
ering them through FDA approval . . . . They wouldn’t do that unless they could 
charge supercompetitive prices to make up for those investments.”). 
 28. Austin Frakt, How Patent Law Can Block Even Lifesaving Drugs, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 28, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/29/upshot/how 
-patent-law-can-block-even-lifesaving-drugs.html. 
 29. See id. 
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2. The Role of Antitrust Law 
The FTC is the federal agency tasked with enforcing federal 
antitrust law.30 The FTC “takes action to stop and prevent unfair 
business practices that are likely to reduce competition and lead 
to higher prices, reduced quality or levels of service, or less inno-
vation.”31 Examples of prohibited anticompetitive behavior in-
clude “activities like price fixing, group boycotts, and exclusion-
ary exclusive dealing contracts or trade association rules.”32 The 
FTC enforces federal antitrust law to promote and protect com-
petition at both the distribution and manufacturing levels of the 
pharmaceutical chain.33 The Agency’s policy states that “[i]n 
pharmaceutical product markets, price generally decreases as 
the number of generic competitors increases.”34 Thus the FTC 
promotes the entrance of generic drugs into the market place to 
compete with name-brand labels.35 
3. The Problem with Protecting Economic Interests 
The intersection between federal patent law and antitrust 
law becomes problematic when pharmaceutical companies like 
Mylan and Turing dramatically increase their drug prices. Pa-
tent law protects inventions by excluding competitors from the 
market for a limited time,36 effectively granting the ability to ex-
clude others in a monopolistic way. In situations where a patent 
holder has no existing competition, the ability to exclude any po-
tential competition all but ensures a monopoly in effect.37 In-
 
 30. FTC, COMPETITION ISSUES IN THE DISTRIBUTION OF PHARMACEUTI-
CALS 2 (2014), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/attachments/ 
us-submissions-oecd-other-international-competition-fora/pharmaceuticals_ 
us_oecd.pdf [hereinafter FTC, COMPETITION ISSUES]. Among other things, the 
FTC seeks to influence competition policy and promote competitive practices by 
studying markets and marketing practices, as well as advocate for competition 
policy to the Congress as it considers adopting laws and regulations. Id.  
 31. Anticompetitive Practices, FTC, https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/ 
anticompetitive-practices (last visited June 18, 2018). 
 32. Id. These practices are generally grouped into two types: “agreements 
between competitors, also referred to as horizontal conduct,” and “monopoliza-
tion [of the market by one company], also referred to as single firm conduct.” Id. 
 33. See id. 
 34. FTC, COMPETITION ISSUES, supra note 30, at 6. 
 35. See id. at 6–7. 
 36. See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2012). 
 37. See Carolyn Y. Johnson & Catherine Ho, How Mylan, the Maker of Ep-
iPen, Became a Virtual Monopoly, WASH. POST (Aug. 25, 2016), https://www 
.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/2016/08/25/7f83728a-6aee-11e6-ba32 
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versely, the competing principle of antitrust law seeks to pro-
mote and protect competition. That purpose directly contradicts 
federal patent law’s grant of exclusion.38 It is within this con-
flicting framework of federal law that various mechanisms have 
been proposed to ease the tension and place a restraint on phar-
maceutical prices. 
C. A MECHANISM TO CONTROL DRUG PRICES THROUGH 
INCREASED GENERIC COMPETITION: THE HATCH-WAXMAN ACT 
In September 1984, Congress passed the Drug Price Compe-
tition and Patent Term Restoration Act, also known as the 
Hatch-Waxman Act.39 Hatch-Waxman created a regulatory 
scheme governing the approval of generic drugs by the FDA. The 
Act aimed to encourage innovators to invest in the research and 
development of new drugs on one hand, and “increase generic 
drug competition in the pharmaceutical drug market, thereby 
lowering drug prices and consumer costs for drugs” on the 
other.40 Hatch-Waxman attempts to improve the number of ge-
neric drugs in the market by prohibiting “reverse payments”: 
agreements between brand-name drug manufacturers and ge-
neric drug manufacturers, whereby the brand-name manufac-
turer pays the generic manufacturer to keep its drugs out of the 
 
-5a4bf5aad4fa_story.html (“Mylan benefited from factors including failed com-
petitors, patent protections and laws requiring allergy medications in schools. 
Having a virtual monopoly has facilitated the rapid price hike. Mylan reached 
$1 billion in sales for the second time last year.”). 
 38. Lara J. Glasgow, Stretching the Limits of Intellectual Property Rights: 
Has the Pharmaceutical Industry Gone Too Far?, 41 IDEA: J.L. & TECH. 227, 
231 (2001) (“It is when intellectual property rights are utilized beyond their 
rightful scope that intellectual property law is no longer in balance with anti-
trust law, but rather in direct conflict. In situations where intellectual property 
rights are used to obtain unwarranted market power, or to interfere with com-
petition beyond what is enabled by the law, antitrust law must step in to curtail 
the potential excessive cost to the consuming public.”). 
 39. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. 
L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 355, 360(cc) (2012), 
35 U.S.C. §§ 156, 271, 282 (2012)), amended by Medicare Prescription Drug, 
Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 
2066 (2003) (commonly known as the Hatch-Waxman Act); see also Legislative 
and Regulatory Responses to the FTC Study on Barriers to Entry in the Phar-
maceutical Marketplace: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th 
Cong. 8, 14 (2003) [hereinafter 2003 Hearing] (statement of Daniel E. Troy, 
Chief Counsel, FDA) (explaining the impetus and importance of the Hatch-Wax-
man Act); Colleen Kelly, The Balance Between Innovation and Competition: The 
Hatch-Waxman Act, The 2003 Amendments, and Beyond, 66 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 
417, 417 (2011). 
 40. Kelly, supra note 39. 
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market.41 Reverse payments remove competition in the market, 
allowing brand-name manufacturers to maintain the high price 
of their brand-name products for longer than normally permitted 
under their patent rights.42 The FTC has stated that it will liti-
gate against reverse-payment schemes to protect consumers 
from anticompetitive conduct that raises prices and diminishes 
drug choices.43 
A recent report concluded that Hatch-Waxman has success-
fully promoted generic drug competition. At the time of the Act’s 
passage in 1984, “only approximately 35% of brand-name block-
buster drugs had generic counterparts, while today, virtually all 
brand-name blockbuster drugs have generic counterparts.”44 
Still, the issue is far from settled; scholars continue to debate the 
Act’s success in ensuring competition by promoting generic 
drugs in the marketplace.45 
D. OTHER FEDERAL ATTEMPTS TO CONTROL DRUG PRICES 
Although proposed by various members of Congress over the 
past decade, the federal government has yet to enact any of the 
recommended legislation to increase generic competition and 
 
 41. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(2)(A)(iv); see also Henry N. Butler & Jeffrey Paul 
Jarosch, Policy Reversal on Reverse Payments: Why Courts Should Not Follow 
the New DOJ Position on Reverse-Payment Settlements of Pharmaceutical Pa-
tent Litigation, 96 IOWA L. REV. 57, 57 (2010) (“In a reverse-payment settlement, 
the generic drug company agrees not to enter the market for some period of time 
and the patent holder agrees to give it something of value—often quarterly cash 
payments.”). The FTC has found that reverse payments are prevalent in the 
pharmaceutical industry, finding that sixty-six such agreements occurred from 
2004 through 2009. FTC, PAY-FOR-DELAY: HOW DRUG COMPANY PAY-OFFS 
COST CONSUMERS BILLIONS 4 (2010), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/ 
documents/reports/pay-delay-how-drug-company-pay-offs-cost-consumers 
-billions-federal-trade-commission-staff-study/100112payfordelayrpt.pdf [here-
inafter FTC, PAY-FOR-DELAY]. The FTC has also found that such agreements 
delay entry of generic competitors to the market for an average of seventeen 
months. Id. The FTC attempts to litigate and advocate against reverse-payment 
agreements and estimates that these agreements will cost consumers an esti-
mated thirty-five billion dollars over the next ten years. Id. at 2, 5–6. 
 42. FTC, PAY-FOR-DELAY, supra note 41, at 4. 
 43. Id. at 5–6; Anticompetitive Practices, supra note 31. 
 44. WENDY H. SCHACHT & JOHN R. THOMAS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
R41114, THE HATCH-WAXMAN ACT: A QUARTER CENTURY LATER 5 (2012). 
 45. Compare Butler & Jarosch, supra note 41 (arguing that “the effects of 
reverse payments are not obvious, can be procompetitive, and that a presump-
tion of anticompetitive effect is thus unwarranted”), with Emily Michiko Morris, 
The Myth of Generic Pharmaceutical Competition Under the Hatch-Waxman 
Act, 22 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA, & ENT. L.J. 245, 250 (2012) (arguing 
that “the Hatch-Waxman Act’s single-minded fixation on generic manufacturers 
as if they were direct competitors for brand-name pharma is misguided at best”). 
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lower drug prices. This Section briefly discusses four such pro-
posals, including the oft-discussed option of parallel importation. 
1. Prescription Drug Importation 
In 2009, Senator Byron Dorgan, a Democrat from North Da-
kota, cosponsored the Pharmaceutical Market Access and Drug 
Safety Act of 2009.46 The bill sought to amend the Federal Food, 
Drug, and Cosmetic Act to allow for the importation of prescrip-
tion drugs to increase competition, thus lowering drug prices.47 
Specifically, the bill would have allowed American consumers to 
import lower-priced, FDA-approved drugs from other coun-
tries.48 Despite offering immediate relief to consumers from 
soaring drug prices via international competition, the bill died in 
Congress.49 
2. The Prescription Drug Affordability Act 
In 2015, Senator Bernie Sanders, an Independent from Ver-
mont, proposed the Prescription Drug Affordability Act of 
2015,50 which sought to “ensure greater affordability of prescrip-
tion drugs.”51 The bill proposed to give the Secretary of Health 
and Human Services the power to negotiate lower drug prices on 
behalf of Medicaid beneficiaries, allow pharmacists and whole-
salers to import prescription drugs, block reverse payments from 
brand-name drug manufacturers to generic drug manufacturers, 
and require more reporting by pharmaceutical companies.52 The 
bill, referred to a congressional committee on September 10, 
2015, died in committee.53 
 
 46. See Pharmaceutical Market Access and Drug Safety Act of 2009, S. 525, 
111th Cong. (2009). 
 47. See id.  
 48. Id. 
 49. S. 525 (111th): Pharmaceutical Market Access and Drug Safety Act of 
2009, GOVTRACK, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/111/s525 (last visited 
June 18, 2018). 
 50. Prescription Drug Affordability Act of 2015, S. 2023, 114th Cong. 
(2015). 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. S. 2023 (114th): Prescription Drug Affordability Act of 2015, GOVTRACK, 
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/114/s2023 (last visited June 18, 2018). 
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3. Medicaid Generic Drug Price Fairness Act of 2015 
On May 18, 2015, Senator Sanders proposed the Medicaid 
Generic Drug Price Fairness Act of 2015.54 The bill sought to 
amend title XIX (Medicaid) of the Social Security Act to increase 
rebates of generic drugs.55 Cosponsored by six other senators,56 
the bill attempted a modest reform to current pharmaceutical 
pricing to provide relief for consumers. The bill also died in com-
mittee.57 The failure of this bill to make it past the Finance Com-
mittee demonstrates the unlikelihood that Congress will ever en-
act this—or an equivalently simple—measure.58 
4. Parallel Importation 
Parallel importation gained traction as a viable option to 
combat the rising cost of prescription drugs as a result of the 
 
 54. Medicaid Generic Drug Price Fairness Act of 2015, S. 1364, 114th Cong. 
(2015). 
 55. The proposed bill would amend 
[T]itle XIX (Medicaid) of the Social Security Act to increase the amount 
of rebate with respect to each generic drug in the manner that the re-
bate for a dosage form and strength of a single source drug or an inno-
vator multiple source drug is increased, except as provided in special 
application rules, including a special rule for certain noninnovator mul-
tiple source drugs. 
S.1364 – Medicaid Generic Drug Price Fairness Act of 2015, CONGRESS.GOV, 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/senate-bill/1364 (last visited June 
18, 2018). 
 56. Senators Sherrod Brown (D-OH), Mazie Hirono (D-HI), Richard Blu-
menthal (D-CT), Al Franken (D-MN), Elizabeth Warren (D-MA), and Sheldon 
Whitehouse (D-RI) cosponsored the bill along with Senator Sanders. S.1364 - 
Medicaid Generic Drug Price Fairness Act of 2015, CONGRESS.GOV, https:// 
www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/senate-bill/1364/cosponsors (last visited 
June 18, 2018). 
 57. Id.; S. 1364 (114th): Medicaid Generic Drug Price Fairness Act of 2015, 
GOVTRACK, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/114/s1364 (last visited June 
18, 2018). As discussed, the numerous proposed and yet to be enacted pieces of 
legislation demonstrate the disagreement over how to promote generic compe-
tition and decrease drug prices, whether a partisan bill or not. But with Repub-
lican majority in both houses of Congress and a GOP president, it is possible 
the federal government may enact some legislation. A Kaiser Family Founda-
tion survey found that more Republicans were angry about drug prices than 
about Obamacare. Paul Demko & Sarah Karlin, GOP Candidates Stuck on Drug 
Prices, POLITICO (Dec. 1, 2015), https://www.politico.com/story/2015/11/drug 
-costs-gop-candidates-prescriptions-216292. Republicans are also part of the 
huge majorities that back strong government measures to make drug prices 
more affordable. Id. Time will tell if the Republicans will enact legislation to 
promote generic drug competition. 
 58. Numerous other bills were proposed in 2017 alone, but did not gain 
traction. See Ron Lanton III, The Current State of Drug Price Legislation, SPE-
CIALTY PHARMACY TIMES (Nov. 16, 2017), https://www 
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wide support it received from President Trump and legislators.59 
Parallel importation allows goods to be “produced genuinely un-
der protection of a trademark, patent, or copyright, placed into 
circulation in one market, and then imported into a second mar-
ket without the authorization of the local owner of the intellec-
tual property right.”60 Essentially, parallel importation allows 
consumers to directly import drugs from another country at a 
much cheaper price without violating the intellectual property 
rights of the patent holder in the United States. Congress has 
yet to seriously consider this option. Various members of Con-
gress often cite safety concerns as the biggest reason why they 
do not support current parallel-importation proposals.61 The 
FDA itself has stated that “there are significant safety concerns 
related to allowing the reimportation of non-bioequivalent prod-
ucts” into the United States.62 Until bioequivalent products from 
other countries can meet the FDA’s strict requirements regard-
ing health and safety, parallel importation likely remains an un-
obtainable solution. 
As briefly summarized above, Congress has yet to address 
the rising costs of pharmaceutical products. Its failure to pass 
the Pharmaceutical Market Access and Drug Safety Act, the Pre-
scription Drug Affordability Act, and Medicaid Generic Drug 
Price Fairness Act demonstrates congressional inability or un-
willingness to enact meaningful legislation to reduce soaring 
drug prices. On January 11, 2017, Congress had yet another 
chance to take a step toward combatting rising drug prices.63 
Senator Amy Klobuchar, a Democrat from Minnesota, intro-




 59. See David Nather, Trump’s Health Care Plan Takes (Another) Page 
from the Democrats, STAT (Mar. 2, 2016), https://www.statnews.com/2016/03/ 
02/trump-health-care-plan. 
 60. KEITH E. MASKUS, PARALLEL IMPORTS IN PHARMACEUTICALS: IMPLICA-
TIONS FOR COMPETITION AND PRICES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 2 (2001), 
http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/about-ip/en/studies/pdf/ssa_maskus_pi 
.pdf. 
 61. See Zach Carter & Ryan Grim, Cory Booker and a Bunch of Democrats 
Prove Trump Right on Big Pharma, HUFFPOST (Jan. 12, 2017), https://www 
.huffingtonpost.com/entry/democrats-rush-to-prove-trump-right-on-big 
-pharma_us_5877edd4e4b0b3c7a7b05c29. 
 62. Alicia Mundy, FDA Questions Reimportation of Drugs, WALL ST. J. 
(Dec. 9, 2009), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB126036822300483431. 
 63. S. Amdt. 178 to S. Con. Res. 3, CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress 
.gov/amendment/115th-congress/senate-amendment/178/text (last visited June 
18, 2018). 
 2018] A MODEL ACT 2509 
 
parallel importation of drugs from Canada64—which is currently 
illegal under federal law.65 However, the Senate voted the 
amendment down.66 Many who voted no, including prominent 
New Jersey Democrat Cory Booker, cited the amendment’s lack 
of consumer protections and deficient safety standards.67 Even 
though it was a purely symbolic, nonbinding measure that would 
not have had the force of law if enacted,68 the fact that the Sen-
ate “voted against reducing drug prices” represents yet another 
example of Congress’s inaction in the war against rising drug 
prices.69 Its current failure offers little hope for any legislation 
designed to combat rising drug costs. 
But why has Congress refused to enact any legislation 
aimed at lowering drug prices? It might soon, as President 
Trump has expressed support for allowing parallel importation 
of drugs from other countries as well as allowing Medicare to 
negotiate prescription drug prices.70 However, it seems certain 
that the pharmaceutical lobby will continue to impede such 
measures.71 Drug lobbyists spent at least two-hundred million 
 
 64. Id. 
 65. See Marvin A. Blumberg, Information on Importation of Drugs Pre-
pared by the Division of Import Operations and Policy, FDA, https://www.fda 
.gov/ForIndustry/ImportProgram/ucm173751.htm (last updated Sept. 25, 
2015). 
 66. Carter & Grim, supra note 61. 
 67. Id. (“Any plan to allow the importation of prescription medications 
should also include consumer protections that ensure foreign drugs meet Amer-
ican safety standards. I opposed an amendment put forward last night that 
didn’t meet this test.”). 
 68. Louis Jacobson, Viral Image About Democratic Senators and “Big 
Pharma” Is Misleading, POLITIFACT (Jan. 18, 2017), http://www.politifact 
.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2017/jan/18/other-98/viral-image-about 
-democratic-senators-and-big-phar (“The vote was more symbolic than substan-
tive. It was an amendment to a Senate budget resolution, which is a non-binding 
[sic] measure that doesn’t get signed by the president or become law . . . . So the 
measures shouldn’t be oversold as direct action.”). 
 69. See Carter & Grim, supra note 61. 
 70. Nather, supra note 59. 
 71. When discussing how much money Medicare could save if it negotiated 
drug prices, President Trump said, “We don’t do it . . . . Why? Because of the 
drug companies.” Sarah Kliff, Donald Trump Endorses an Idea Liberals Love: 
Letting Medicare Negotiate Drug Prices, VOX (Jan. 26, 2016), https://www.vox 
.com/2016/1/26/10835000/trump-medicare-drug-prices. 
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dollars each of the past nine years seeking to influence legisla-
tors.72 In 2016 alone, lobbyists contributed more than sixty mil-
lion dollars to members of Congress and candidates.73 While ex-
ploring the reasons why Congress continues to oppose reducing 
exorbitant drug prices lies outside the scope of this Note, the 
amount of money drug companies spend on lobbying would 
seemingly be an influential factor. Even if enacted, however, it 
is unlikely that the measures discussed above would sufficiently 
restrict dramatic price increases of pharmaceuticals. 
II.  ISSUES WITH PROPOSED STATE SOLUTIONS TO 
COMBAT DRAMATIC PRICE INCREASES OF 
PHARMACEUTICALS   
As discussed in Part I, federal legislators have proposed var-
ious methods to limit soaring pharmaceutical prices, but to date 
have failed to enact any meaningful legislation. This Section ad-
dresses various states’ attempts to regulate this crisis. 
A. STATE-LEVEL REGULATION 
Given the federal government’s inaction, individual states 
have enacted their own laws in an attempt to curb the rising 
costs of pharmaceuticals. However, the legislative efforts, at 
least to date, arguably do not go far enough to address the soar-
ing prices of drugs—whether because the laws are limited in 
scope, ineffective, or preempted by federal law. 
1. States’ Attempts To Control Drug Prices Through 
Transparency Legislation 
In 2017, the California State Legislature enacted a new bill 
titled Health Care: Prescription Drug Costs.74 Among other 
things, the bill requires: 
[A] manufacturer of a prescription drug with a wholesale acquisition 
cost of more than $40 that is purchased or reimbursed by specified pur-
chasers, including state agencies, health care service plans, health in-
surers, and pharmacy benefit managers, to notify the purchaser of an 
increase in the wholesale acquisition cost of a prescription drug if the 
increase in the wholesale acquisition cost for a course of therapy, as 
defined, exceeds a specified threshold.75 
 
 72. Pharmaceuticals/Health Products, OPENSECRETS.ORG, https://www 
.opensecrets.org/lobby/indusclient.php?id=h04 (last visited June 18, 2018). 
 73. Id. 
 74. S.B. 17, 2017–2018 Sess. (Cal. 2017). 
 75. Id. 
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The California Legislature intended to make “pharmaceutical 
pricing as transparent as the pricing in other sectors of the 
health care industry.”76 Much to the chagrin of the pharmaceu-
tical lobby, California’s Governor Jerry Brown signed the bill 
into law in October of 2017.77 
California is not alone in its efforts to combat rising drug 
prices through transparency legislation. As of June 2017, thir-
teen other states introduced or passed transparency bills de-
signed to compel drug companies to release information relating 
to costs and pricing.78 While the covered drugs, reporting re-
quirements, and public-disclosure exemptions vary from state to 
state, compelling companies to publicly disclose their costs in or-
der to justify their price tags could lead to reduced drug prices; 
at least that is the goal.79 However, whether transparency in 
pricing alone can reduce and prevent dramatic pharmaceutical 
price increases has yet to be seen, and more time is needed to see 
the effects of these legislative efforts. 
 
 76. Id. Upon signing the bill California Governor Jerry Brown advocated 
that “Californians have a right to know why their medical costs are out of con-
trol, especially when pharmaceutical profits are soaring . . . . This measure is a 
step at bringing transparency, truth, exposure to a very important part of our 
lives, that is the cost of prescription drugs.” April Dembosky, California Gover-
nor Signs Law to Make Drug Pricing More Transparent, NPR (Oct. 10, 2017), 
https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2017/10/10/556896668/california 
-governor-signs-law-to-make-drug-pricing-more-transparent. 
 77. Dembosky, supra note 76 (“The drug lobby fiercely opposed the bill . . . 
hiring 45 firms to try to defeat it and spending $16.8 million on lobbying against 
the full range of drug legislation.”). 
 78. AARON BERMAN ET AL., YALE GLOBAL HEALTH JUSTICE PARTNERSHIP, 
CURBING UNFAIR DRUG PRICES: A PRIMER FOR STATES 15–17 (2017); see also 
Lydia Ramsey, “More Is Possible”: A Bunch of States Are Taking on High Drug 
Prices, and It Could Start Hitting Drugmaker Profits, BUS. INSIDER (June 4, 
2017), http://www.businessinsider.com/states-with-drug-pricing-transparency 
-bills-2017-6/#maryland-is-tackling-generic-drug-price-hikes-1. 
 79. BERMAN ET AL., supra note 78, at 14 (“Understanding what prices are 
and how they are set will allow both patients and regulators to make more in-
formed decisions about whether prices are excessive, and introduce some ration-
ality and evidence into pricing debates. In the current environment, manufac-
turers’ arguments are frequently based on exaggerated and unsubstantiated 
claims.”). For example, proposed legislation in Washington state would require 
a covered manufacturer to report an economic justification for a qualifying price 
increase in a covered drug. H.B. 1541, 65th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2017). This 
would, presumably, have the effect of limiting unjustified pricing increases. 
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2. States’ Attempts To Control Drug Prices Through Price 
Restrictions 
In addition to drug-transparency laws, states have intro-
duced or enacted legislation designed to address unfair price in-
creases of pharmaceuticals. As of 2017, twelve states—including 
New York, Maryland, and Ohio—either proposed or enacted 
such fair-pricing legislation.80 Similar to the drug-transparency 
bills, the fair-pricing bills varied widely in what they covered: 
whether they applied only to generic drugs, brand-name drugs, 
or both; the types of pricing they implicated; if there are report-
ing or price-justification requirements; and if there is a private 
right of action.81 Some of the enacted laws seem promising, al-
beit potentially limited in scope.82 
For example, New York’s statute only requires review of 
pharmaceutical conduct once its Medicaid expenditures surpass 
 
 80. See BERMAN ET AL., supra note 78, at 18–19. 
 81. Id. 
 82. It is worth noting that none of the existing state proposals or legislation 
preempt this Note. Legislation aimed at transparency does not provide any av-
enue for states to actually lower drug prices. Rather, transparency laws (might) 
allow a state to bring a claim against manufacturers for noncompliance with 
reporting requirements. See, for example, Vermont’s Prescription Drug Cost 
Containment statute. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4635 (2018). See also BERMAN ET 
AL., supra note 78, at 15–17. Additionally, of the fair drug-pricing bills that have 
been introduced by states since 2015, the majority have either failed to become 
enacted or are currently stuck in legislative committees. See id. at 18–19; see 
also S.B. 925, 2017 Sess. (Conn. 2017); H.B. 5930, 2017 Sess. (Conn. 2017); H.B. 
2983, 190th Gen. Court (Mass. 2017); S.B. 3088, 217th Leg. (N.J. 2017); H.B. 
2387, 2017 Sess. (Or. 2017); H.B. 161, Reg. Sess. 2017–2018 (Pa. 2017); S.B. 
S.1048, 189th Gen. Court (Mass. 2015). Further, state legislation that has been 
enacted is either limited in scope or otherwise does not go far enough to mean-
ingfully regulate pharmaceutical behavior: Maryland’s legislation is limited to 
generic drugs only, while New York’s legislation applies only to generic drugs 
or the amount to be spent by the state’s Medicaid program. See BERMAN ET AL., 
supra note 78, at 18–19; infra notes 83–84. Additionally, Nevada’s legislation is 
limited to diabetes medication. S.B. 539, 79th Sess. (Nev. 2017). For an addi-
tional roundup of current state-level legislative actions, see Prescription Drug 
Cost Workgroup, NAT’L ACAD. FOR STATE HEALTH POL’Y (Apr. 11, 2017), https:// 
nashp.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/2017-Rx-Legislation-Tracker-4.11.pdf. 
This Note attempts to apply to all pharmaceutical conduct—not just conduct 
relating to generic drugs or Medicaid expenditures. It seeks to extend farther 
and be more comprehensive than any current legislative effort. The biggest ad-
vantage this Note provides, as discussed in Part IV.A, infra, is its attempt to 
address patent preemption head-on. No current state effort does so. 
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a certain budgetary threshold—it does not implicate the expend-
itures of residents who do not use Medicaid.83 Maryland’s legis-
lation, on the other hand, applies to off-patent or generic drugs 
only.84 The impact of these fair-pricing bills has yet to be seen. 
Although limited in scope, New York and Maryland’s legis-
lation has, to date, survived all legal challenges. The same can-
not be said for all similar efforts. For example, Maine enacted 
the Maine Pharmacy Act in 2013. The Act sought to “lower the 
cost of medicines for state residents” by permitting them “to pur-
chase prescription drugs through a broker from pharmacies . .  .  
licensed in Canada, the U.K., New Zealand and Australia.”85 Ad-
ditionally, the District of Columbia passed the Excessive Pricing 
in Sales of Prescription Drugs Act in 2005.86 The Act outlawed 
drug manufacturers from selling patented prescription drugs for 
an excessive price.87 Both Acts immediately drew ire from the 
pharmaceutical industry, who quickly challenged the legislation 
in court. Indeed, both the District of Columbia’s and Maine’s 
meaningful attempts at cost-reducing legislation were 
preempted by federal patent law.88 
B. THE PATENT ACT, SUPREMACY CLAUSE, AND PREEMPTION 
State proposals to control soaring drug prices can attract 
preemption challenges, particularly under federal patent law. At 
the same time, preemption of a state’s ability to implement leg-
islation to regulate pharmaceutical pricing and protect consum-
 
 83. See S. 2007-B, N.Y. S. (N.Y. 2017), http://legislation.nysenate.gov/pdf/ 
bills/2017/S2007B; see also Julie Appleby, New York State Wants Its Prescrip-
tion Drug Money Back—Or Else, KHN (May 22, 2017), https://khn.org/news/ 
new-york-state-wants-its-prescription-drug-money-back-or-else. 
 84. See H.B. 631, 2017 Reg. Sess. (Md. 2017), http://mgaleg.maryland.gov/ 
2017RS/Chapters_noln/CH_818_hb0631e.pdf. 
 85. Ed Silverman, Judge Strikes Down Maine Law for Importing Prescrip-
tion Medicines, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 25, 2015), http://blogs.wsj.com/pharmalot/ 
2015/02/25/judge-strikes-down-maine-law-for-importing-prescription 
-medicines. 
 86. D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-4553 (West 2005).  
 87. Id. The full text of the Act reads: “It shall be unlawful for any drug 
manufacturer or licensee thereof, excluding a point of sale retail seller, to sell 
or supply for sale or impose minimum resale requirements for a patented pre-
scription drug that results in the prescription drug being sold in the District for 
an excessive price.” Id. 
 88. See Biotechnology Indus. Org. v. District of Columbia, 496 F.3d 1362, 
1374 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“[W]e conclude that [D.C. Code § 28-4553] is preempted 
by federal patent law.”); Silverman, supra note 85. This Note seeks to address 
the obstacle of preemption head on. 
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ers within its borders limits the state’s power and raises im-
portant federalism concerns. 
1. Preemption of States’ Pharmaceutical Pricing Legislation: 
The Supremacy Clause 
Federal preemption over states’ abilities to enact laws de-
rives from the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution. The Su-
premacy Clause states: 
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be 
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be 
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme 
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, 
any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary 
notwithstanding.89 
“It is a familiar and well-established principle that the Suprem-
acy Clause invalidates state laws that interfere with, or are con-
trary to, federal law.”90 However, this principle can be at odds 
with “the presumption that state and local regulation of health 
and safety matters can constitutionally coexist with federal reg-
ulation.”91 The presumption that state regulation of health and 
safety matters can coexist with federal regulation is a particu-
larly strong.92 Such state regulation is usually considered to be 
under the sole jurisdiction of the states’ police power, as “[s]tates 
traditionally have had great latitude under their police powers 
 
 89. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 90. Hillsborough Cty. v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 712 
(1985). 
 91. Id. at 716.  
 92. Id. (“Appellee must thus present a showing of implicit pre-emption of 
the whole field, or of a conflict between a particular local provision and the fed-
eral scheme, that is strong enough to overcome the presumption that state and 
local regulation of health and safety matters can constitutionally coexist with 
federal regulation.”). This presumption applies for areas of traditional state po-
lice power as well. See Gobeille v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 136 S. Ct. 936, 946 
(2016) (“The Court in the past has ‘addressed claims of pre-emption with the 
starting presumption that Congress does not intend to supplant state law,’ in 
particular state laws regulating a subject of traditional state power.” (citation 
omitted)); De Buono v. NYSA-ILA Med. & Clinical Servs. Fund, 520 U.S. 806, 
814 (1997) (“[The act] clearly operates in a field that ‘has been traditionally oc-
cupied by the States.’ Respondents therefore bear the considerable burden of 
overcoming ‘the starting presumption that Congress does not intend to supplant 
state law.’” (citations omitted)). 
 2018] A MODEL ACT 2515 
 
to legislate as to the protection of the lives, limbs, health, com-
fort, and quiet of all persons.”93 Regardless of this strong pre-
sumption, if a conflict between a state law and a federal law ex-
ists, the federal law predominates.94 
Courts generally presume that a state law is not preempted. 
However, express or implied preemption may overcome that pre-
sumption.95 Starting with this presumption, courts will look to 
congressional intent, determined by the plain language of the 
statute, the statutory framework surrounding the statute, and 
the “structure and purpose of the statute as a whole.”96 Express 
preemption occurs when the federal law or regulation expressly 
states that it preempts any state law.97 Express preemption of 
the entire field “will be inferred where ‘the field is one in which 
the federal interest is so dominant that the federal system will 
be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same 
subject.’”98 Correspondingly, if Congress did not include express 
preemptive language, “Congress’[s] intent to pre-empt all state 
law in a particular area may be inferred where the scheme of 
federal regulation is sufficiently comprehensive to make reason-
able the inference that Congress ‘left no room’ for supplementary 
state regulation.”99 This is known as field preemption. Addition-
ally, implied preemption also exists “where state regulation ac-
tually conflicts with federal law, or where state regulation 
‘stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution’ of 
Congress’s purposes.”100 This is known as conflict preemption. 
 
 93. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 756 (1985), over-
ruled in part on other grounds, Ky. Ass’n of Health Plans v. Miller, 538 U.S. 329 
(2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 94. See id. at 749 (noting that the preemption doctrine “protects against 
state interference with policies implicated” by federal law). 
 95. Id. at 738, 747–48 (noting that express or implied congressional intent 
determines whether the state law is preempted); see also Malone v. White Motor 
Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 504 (1978) (“Often Congress does not clearly state in its 
legislation whether it intends to pre-empt state laws; and in such instances, the 
courts normally sustain local regulation of the same subject matter unless it 
conflicts with federal law or would frustrate the federal scheme, or unless the 
courts discern from the totality of the circumstances that Congress sought to 
occupy the field to the exclusion of the States.”). 
 96. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 486 (1996) (citations omitted). 
 97. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977) (discussing express 
preemption). 
 98. Hillsborough Cty. v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713, 
(1985) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)). 
 99. Id. 
 100. Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 547 (1992) (quoting Hines 
v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).  
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Preemption often prohibits state law from regulating the phar-
maceutical field, making it impossible for states to regulate pric-
ing. 
2. Preemption in Practice 
Recall the District of Columbia’s Excessive Pricing in Sales 
of Prescription Drugs legislation,101 designed to outlaw drug 
manufacturers from selling patented prescription drugs for an 
excessive price.102 The pharmaceutical industry quickly chal-
lenged the legislation, and the case made its way up to the Court 
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in Biotechnology Industry Or-
ganization v. District of Columbia.103 The Federal Circuit de-
cided the case on conflict preemption grounds, finding that the 
Act conflicted with the purposes of federal patent law.104 The 
court found that the Act’s purpose of penalizing manufacturers 
who set their prices at excessive levels limited those manufac-
turers’ ability to exercise their full patent rights granted to them 
on their pharmaceutical products—namely, their right to set 
their own prices however they saw fit.105 The court stated that 
the “economic rewards during the period of [patent] exclusivity 
are the carrot. . . . Upon grant of the patent, the only limitation 
on the size of the carrot should be the dictates of the market-
place.”106 The court acknowledged that states have general po-
lice power within their borders, but noted that state laws are 
preempted by federal law when they interfere or conflict with 
federal laws.107 
 
 101. Supra notes 86–87. 
 102. Id. The Act defined “excessive” as: “where the wholesale price of a pa-
tented prescription drug in the District is over 30% higher than the comparable 
price in any high income country in which the product is protected by patents 
or other exclusive marketing rights.” See D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-4554 (West 
2005). 
 103. 496 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2007).  
 104. Id. at 1374 (noting the goals of the D.C. statute may be worthwhile, but 
they were “contrary to the goals established by Congress in the patent laws” 
and were thus preempted). 
 105. Id. (“By penalizing high prices—and thus limiting the full exercise of 
the exclusionary power that derives from a patent—the District has chosen to 
re-balance the statutory framework of rewards and incentives insofar as it re-
lates to inventive new drugs.”). 
 106. Id. at 1372 (quoting King Instruments Corp. v. Perego, 65 F.3d 941, 950 
(Fed. Cir. 1995)). 
 107. Id. at 1373 (stating “the District has general police powers” but that 
those powers “must yield” to Congressional intent).  
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The District of Columbia legislation is not the only state108 
law struck down by the courts on preemptive grounds. Recall 
that the Maine legislature introduced the Maine Pharmacy Act 
(MPA) in 2013.109 The Act sought to “expand[ ] the definition of 
a ‘mail order prescription pharmacy’ under the [MPA] to include 
an entity located outside of the United States that dispenses pre-
scription medications by mail or carrier from a facility not lo-
cated in this State to a pharmacy or to a patient who resides in 
this State,” effectively allowing parallel importation of pharma-
ceuticals from countries such as Canada.110 In determining the 
legality of the Act, the federal district court noted that “Congress 
has created a complex regulatory scheme covering the importa-
tion of pharmaceuticals into the United States,”111 such as by 
enacting the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA).112 
The FDCA prohibits any “new drug” from being introduced or 
imported into commerce that has not received FDA approval.113 
The court cited Eighth Circuit case law114 and concluded “that 
the FDCA occupies the field of importation of pharmaceuticals 
 
 108. Although not a state, the court in Biotech made it clear that the preemp-
tion doctrine certainly applies to the District of Columbia. See id. at 1371–73. 
In fact, Congress has a long, sometimes controversial history of exerting its will 
on the District of Columbia. See Aaron C. Davis & Peter Jamison, Congress Once 
Ran the Local D.C. Government. GOP Signals That It May Do so Again, WASH. 
POST (Jan. 30, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/dc-politics/ 
congress-once-ran-the-local-dc-government-gop-signaling-it-may-do-so-again/ 
2017/01/30/814f89a2-e71f-11e6-bf6f-301b6b443624_story.html. 
 109. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 13731 (2013).  
 110. An Act to Facilitate the Licensing of International Mail Order Prescrip-
tion Pharmacies by the Maine Board of Pharmacy: Hearing on L.D. 171 Before 
the J. Standing Comm. on Labor, Commerce, Research and Econ. Dev., 126th 
Legis., 1st Sess. (Me. 2013) (statement from Senator Troy Jackson, Assis-
tant Majority Leader), http://www.mainelegislature.org/legis/bills/ 
getTestimonyDoc.asp?id=1095; see Silverman, supra note 85. 
 111. Oullette v. Mills, 91 F. Supp. 3d 1, 10 (D. Me. 2015). 
 112. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–399 (2012). 
 113. Id. § 355(a). 
 114. The court quoted in relevant part: 
That Congress created a special procedure for authorizing importation 
of prescription drugs from Canada supports our conclusion that the 
preexisting system established by the [FDCA] does not permit such im-
portation. While it is true that no federal statute by its express terms 
bans importation of prescription drugs from Canada, such an explicit 
country-by-country prohibition is unnecessary to accomplish the task. 
By creating the comprehensive regulatory system described above, 
Congress has effectively precluded importation of these drugs absent 
the sort of special authorization contemplated by 21 U.S.C. § 384. 
Oullette, 91 F. Supp. 3d at 10 (citing In re Canadian Imp. Antitrust Litig., 470 
F.3d 785, 790 (8th Cir. 2006)). 
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from foreign countries,”115 preempting the Act pursuant to the 
Supremacy Clause. 
To briefly recap, the federal government appears unable or 
unwilling to combat rising drug costs.116 State legislation at-
tempting to restrain drug pricing has either lacked significant 
enforcement power and therefore had limited success (Califor-
nia), or courts have ruled the legislation preempted by federal 
law (District of Columbia and Maine). This resulting inaction at 
both levels of government harms consumers who continue to pay 
unreasonable amounts for necessary drugs. These consumers 
currently have no recourse against these outrageous actions by 
the pharmaceutical companies. 
C. A CONSIDERATION OF THE UNIQUENESS OF 
PHARMACEUTICAL PATENTS 
This Note cannot stress the following plea enough: the 
United States needs to stop pretending pharmaceutical patents 
are similar to any other patented item. Drugs are not televisions, 
cellular devices, or high-end glass.117 Pharmaceuticals are nec-
essary—without them, people die. The same cannot be said for 
almost any other patented device. When political pundits and 
economists say the market acts as a constraint on the monopo-
listic power pharmaceutical patents provide their holders, this 
falsely represents reality. The truth is that pharmaceutical pa-
tents, under current U.S. law, allow patent holders to unjustifi-
ably raise their prices 5000%; and nothing can stop that from 
happening. If a consumer dislikes an Apple iPhone, she can buy 
a Samsung Galaxy. If a consumer does not want to pay thou-
sands of dollars for an expensive television, she chooses some-
thing else—or goes without one entirely. When the patient who 
 
 115. Id. 
 116. Even though numerous bills have been proposed in 2017 alone. See Lan-
ton, supra note 58. 
 117. See Robert Pearl, Why Patent Protection in the Drug Industry Is Out of 
Control, FORBES (Jan. 19, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/robertpearl/ 
2017/01/19/why-patent-protection-in-the-drug-industry-is-out-of-control (“Pa-
tent protection was never intended for use in a situation when human life would 
be endangered through its use. In other areas of society, broad legal prohibitions 
exist to protect human life and the well-being of citizens. For example, individ-
uals are prohibited from yelling ‘Fire!’ in a theater, and utility monopolies that 
control all of the electricity for a city are prohibited from price gouging. Patents 
make sense in a retail or manufacturing context. If you don’t want to purchase 
Venetian glass, you can decide it’s too expensive. In contrast, if your child is 
born with a genetic defect, you have no choice but to obtain the medication avail-
able for treatment regardless of price.”). 
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cannot afford Daraprim or an EpiPen “takes a chance” (or makes 
the “decision”) to go without it, there is a distinct possibility that 
“choice” could prove fatal.118 Pharmaceutical patents are unique 
and should be treated as such. This is a unique problem that re-
quires a unique solution. With this backdrop, this Note now 
turns to suggest a way to combat the increasingly drastic price 
increases of pharmaceutical products. 
III.  A SUGGESTED MODEL STATE STATUTE DESIGNED 
TO AVOID FEDERAL PREEMPTION AND GIVE STATES 
MEANINGFUL ABILITY TO CONTROL SOARING DRUG 
PRICES WHILE STILL RESPECTING PATENT RIGHTS   
This Part sets forth a model state statute (Model Act) that 
state legislatures could enact to effect meaningful change in pre-
venting dramatic price increases in pharmaceutical products. 
Section A brings together pieces of state consumer protection 
statutes and antigouging laws to create a framework for the 
Model Act. Section B lays out the Model Act and discusses the 
reasoning behind each specific provision. The Model Act builds 
on what previous legislative enactments did well, while improv-
ing on areas where they fell short.119 It is designed to avoid fed-
eral preemption while effectively controlling prices.120 
 
 118. See Anna Edney, EpiPen Failures Cited in Seven Deaths This Year, 
FDA Files Show, WASH. POST (Nov. 4, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
national/health-science/suspected-epipen-failures-have-been-linked-to-deaths 
-and-hospitalizations/2017/11/03/446d847a-bff6-11e7-97d9-bdab5a0ab381_ 
story.html (noting that even those that have EpiPens have died due to injector 
malfunctioning). 
 119. See supra Part.II.B.2. 
 120. This Note also seeks to build on two prior Notes that advocated for re-
visions to the District of Columbia’s Prescription Drug Excessive Pricing Act to 
ensure a court would not find it preempted. See Serena Lipski, Note, Excessive 
Pricing and Pharmaceuticals: Why the Federal Patent Act Does Not Preempt 
State Regulation of Pharmaceutical Prices, 39 U. TOL. L. REV. 913, 940 (2008) 
(“If D.C. enlarges its statute to affect pricing of all pharmaceutical products, 
patented or not, the new statute should be free from preemption problems.”); 
Christopher Lea Lockwood, Note, Biotechnology Industry Organization v. Dis-
trict of Columbia: A Preemptive Strike Against State Price Restrictions on Pre-
scription Pharmaceuticals, 19 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 143, 179 (2009) (“If the 
Excessive Pricing Act was revised to apply generally to all pharmaceuticals ra-
ther than targeting only those protected by patents, the Act would probably not 
be subject to preemption.”).  
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A. SUPPORT FOR PHARMACEUTICAL PRICING LEGISLATION 
DRAWN FROM EXISTING LEGAL PRINCIPLES 
This Section provides an overview of principles from various 
consumer protection statutes that provide a base and justifica-
tion for state-level regulation of pharmaceutical pricing. Using 
consumer protection statutes as a framework for the Model Act 
ensures consumers remain at the forefront of who the Model Act 
is designed to protect. 
1. State Consumer Protection: Unfair and Deceptive Acts and 
Practices Statutes 
State consumer protection statutes establish a helpful start-
ing point for why state-level regulation of pharmaceutical pric-
ing can and should succeed. Unfair and Deceptive Acts and Prac-
tices (UDAP) statutes exist in all fifty states and the District of 
Columbia.121 These statutes provide the main protection for con-
sumers against predatory and unscrupulous business prac-
tices.122 
One of two main takeaways from general UDAP statutes to 
apply to state-level regulation is the comprehensive prohibition 
on unfair business practices. By broadly prohibiting unfair busi-
ness practices of manufacturers, distributors, and other actors 
in the pharmaceutical industry, “rather than confining the pro-
hibition to a closed list of [unfair] practices,” states could regu-
late and prohibit new methods of unfair practices as they 
emerge.123 By broadly prohibiting unfair business practices, 
states could give themselves the leeway to keep up with current 
and future pharmaceutical pricing practices.124 
The second main takeaway from UDAP statutes to apply to 
state-level regulation is the delegation of rulemaking authority. 
According to the National Consumer Law Center: 
 
 121. See generally CAROLYN L. CARTER, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR. INC., 
CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE STATES: A 50-STATE REPORT ON UNFAIR AND 
DECEPTIVE ACTS AND PRACTICES STATUTES (2009), http://www.nclc.org/ 
images/pdf/udap/report_50_states.pdf (discussing UDAP statutes in the United 
States). 
 122. Id. at 5 (“Although UDAP statutes vary widely from state to state, their 
basic premise is that unfair and deceptive tactics in the marketplace are inap-
propriate. UDAP statutes are the basic legal underpinning for fair treatment of 
consumers in the marketplace.”). 
 123. Id. at 11. 
 124. This argument is specifically addressed in the context of patent preemp-
tion in Part.IV.A, infra. 
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The strongest UDAP statutes . . . allow a state agency to issue detailed 
regulations prohibiting specific unfair . . . practices. The authority to 
issue regulations means that the state can target emerging or persis-
tent unfair . . . acts and practices and develop state-based solutions. It 
means that states can add bright-line rules to their general prohibi-
tions, so that there is no question that a certain practice is unfair. . . . 
Specific rules also act as helpful guidelines for businesses that want to 
use fair practices. 
Similarly, states could delegate authority and rulemaking power 
to state agencies to monitor and regulate unfair pharmaceutical 
business practices, including regulating unfair pricing. By dele-
gating authority, states would give agencies broad leeway to con-
tinuously monitor and update their rules according to ever-
evolving unfair practices. This would also ensure faster re-
sponses—and faster decision making—to dramatic price in-
creases as the specified agency would be able to monitor such 
practices more effectively than the state legislature. Delegating 
to state agencies also prevents vexatious litigation, a concern of-
ten voiced when discussing consumer protection laws. 
2. Antigouging Laws After Emergencies 
Many states, including California125 and New Jersey,126 
have antigouging laws to curb businesses from raising their 
prices for a specified period after a declared emergency. Virginia, 
Florida, and Georgia have similar anti-price-gouging laws as 
well.127 Three primary models of state anti-price-gouging laws 
include: (1) a “percentage increase cap model,” which limits 
“post-disaster price increases . . . to a specific percentage over 
 
 125. California’s law limits the maximum price retailers can raise their 
prices after an emergency to ten percent. See Rafi Mohammed, The Problem 
With Price Gouging Laws, HARV. BUS. REV. (July 23, 2013), https://hbr.org/ 
2013/07/the-problem-with-price-gouging-laws. 
 126. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-109 (West 2017) (“It shall be an unlawful prac-
tice for any person to sell or offer to sell within 30 days after the declaration of 
a state of emergency, or for such other period of time as the Governor may spec-
ify in the declaration of a state of emergency, in the area for which the state of 
emergency has been declared, any merchandise which is consumed or used as a 
direct result of an emergency or which is consumed or used to preserve, protect, 
or sustain the life, health, safety or comfort of persons or their property for a 
price that constitutes an excessive price increase. The Governor may by execu-
tive order extend the period during which this prohibition remains in force.”). 
New Jersey’s anti-price-gouging law also limits the maximum amount a busi-
ness can increase its prices after an emergency to ten percent. Id. § 56:8-108 
(defining “excessive price increase”).  
 127. See Geoffrey C. Rapp, Gouging: Terrorist Attacks, Hurricanes, and the 
Legal and Economic Aspects of Post-Disaster Price Regulation, 94 KY. L.J. 535, 
542–43 (2005). 
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pre-disaster prices”; (2) a bar on “unconscionable” price in-
creases, which bars increases deemed unconscionable “with var-
ying definitions of unconscionability” depending on the state; 
and (3) a total ban on any price increases at all.128 Exceptions 
may be granted to merchants—at least as they relate to the per-
centage-increase cap model—who can show specific increases in 
their own costs, such as increased production and distribution 
costs.129 
Comparing the rising costs in pharmaceutical drugs to de-
clared emergencies initially sounds inapplicable, as many would 
not consider pharmaceutical price increases a natural disaster. 
Rather, the ability to price without limitation reflects a patent 
holder’s ability to freely conduct its business as condoned by fed-
eral patent law. However, states can draw inspiration from anti-
price-gouging laws and apply it to anti-pharmaceutical laws in 
several ways. First, the notion that a state can enact a law that 
bars unconscionable price increases after an emergency is com-
pelling. Many states already have anti-price-gouging laws that 
bar the sale of goods at “unconscionably high prices” or “grossly 
excessive prices” after emergencies.130 States could also imple-
ment a broad prohibition against unconscionable price increases 
when attempting to regulate pharmaceutical companies from 
dramatically increasing their prices.131 
Second, comparing the United States’ current healthcare 
situation—specifically the cost of healthcare and medication—to 
an emergency is not an unfounded assertion.132 States could 
 
 128. Id. at 543. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Rapp, supra note 127, at 544 (stating “Massachusetts, Virginia, Florida, 
Indiana, and South Carolina, attack gouging by barring the sale of goods” if the 
price is deemed excessive or unconscionable). 
 131. Maryland has done just that by prohibiting unconscionable price in-
creases of generic drugs within a certain period. See H.B. 631, 2017 Reg. Sess. 
(Md. 2017), http://mgaleg.maryland.gov/2017RS/Chapters_noln/CH_818_ 
hb0631e.pdf. 
 132. For instance, the United States has recently declared a health emer-
gency over the opioid-addiction epidemic. See Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Trump 
Declares Opioid Crisis a “Health Emergency” but Requests No Funds, N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 26, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/26/us/politics/trump 
-opioid-crisis.html; German Lopez, What Declaring a National Emergency Over 
the Opioid Epidemic Could Actually Do, VOX (Oct. 23, 2017), https://www 
.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/8/9/16118526/opioid-epidemic-national 
-emergency. Additionally, several states, including Maryland, Virginia, and 
Florida, have declared a public-health emergency to expand access to overdose 
reversal medication. See Erin Mershon & Andrew Joseph, How U.S. States Have 
Used Emergency Declarations to Fight the Opioid Epidemic, STAT (Aug. 
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draw inspiration from anti-price-gouging statutes and declare 
the current state of pharmaceutical price increases an emer-
gency that necessitates state intervention and regulation.133 
Lastly, state regulation of pharmaceutical pricing can uti-
lize the exceptions that numerous states include in their anti-
price-gouging statutes. For example, Arkansas’s does not outlaw 
a business from increasing its pricing so long as it can demon-
strate that costs imposed on it by its supplier, or increased costs 
of labor or materials, directly attributed to the increased price of 
its product.134 New Jersey has a similar provision in its anti-
price-gouging statute.135 Similarly, state pharmaceutical pricing 
laws could offer exceptions that allow for price increases based 
on increased costs of labor, supplies, or other increases in busi-
ness expenses. 
3. Enacted State Legislation that Regulates Pharmaceuticals 
In addition to the above-mentioned principles of consumer 
protection law, the District of Columbia’s and Maine’s efforts to 
enact meaningful legislation provide important insight. Alt-
hough courts found them preempted by federal law, the Prescrip-
tion Drug Excessive Pricing Act and the MPA contain useful pro-
visions that can further establish the basis for state regulation 
of pharmaceutical pricing. 
 
9, 2017), https://www.statnews.com/2017/08/09/opioids-state-of-emergency 
-states. 
 133. See the discussion of patent preemption and other arguments against 
such state regulation in Part IV, infra. 
 134. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-88-303 (West 2017) (“However, a greater price in-
crease shall not be unlawful if that person can prove that the increase in price 
was directly attributable to additional costs imposed on it by the supplier of the 
goods or directly attributable to additional costs for labor or materials used to 
provide the services, provided that in those situations where the increase in 
price is attributable to additional costs imposed by the seller ’s supplier or addi-
tional costs of providing the good or service during the state of emergency, the 
price represents no more than ten percent (10%) above the total of the cost to 
the seller plus the markup customarily applied by the seller for that good or 
service in the usual course of business immediately prior to the onset of the 
state of emergency.”). 
 135. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-108 (West 2017) (stating that price increases 
of more than ten percent from the price offered immediately before the state of 
emergency are unlawful “unless the price charged by the seller is attributable 
to additional costs imposed by the seller ’s supplier or other costs of providing 
the good or service during the state of emergency,” and even then, the merchant 
is prohibited from marking up the price more than ten percent of their own cost). 
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a. Prescription Drug Excessive Pricing Act of 2005 
The main provision of the District of Columbia’s Excessive 
Pricing Act read as follows: “It shall be unlawful for any drug 
manufacturer or licensee thereof, excluding a point of sale retail 
seller, to sell or supply for sale or impose minimum resale re-
quirements for a patented prescription drug that results in the 
prescription drug being sold in the District for an excessive 
price.”136 When finding the Excessive Pricing Act preempted by 
federal law, the Federal Circuit acknowledged that states have 
general police powers over all property within their borders.137 
However, the court concluded that “any state law, however 
clearly within a State’s acknowledged power, which interferes 
with or is contrary to federal law, must yield.”138 The court de-
termined that the Act was “in no way general, affecting only pa-
tented products” and “applie[d] only to patented drugs,” which 
had the effect of the District attempting to “change federal pa-
tent policy within its borders” contrary to “the goals established 
by Congress in the patent laws.”139 State regulation of pharma-
ceutical products generally, and not just “patented prescription 
drugs” and their pricing as provided for in the Excessive Pricing 
Act, should not violate federal patent law and may therefore 
avoid federal preemption.140 
b. Maine Pharmacy Act 
Although attempting to legalize the importation of drugs 
from Canada—a different objective than direct state regulation 
of pricing—the MPA contained useful language regarding the 
State’s ability to bring action against violators of the Act. The 
MPA allowed for “[t]he State [to] bring an action to enjoin any 
licensee or person from violating this chapter, regardless of 
whether proceedings have been or may be instituted in the Dis-
trict Court or whether criminal proceedings have been or may be 
instituted.”141 As discussed further below,142 states may wish to 
consider delegating monitoring and enforcement authority to a 
state agency to monitor and regulate pharmaceutical pricing. In 
 
 136. D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-4553 (West 2005). 
 137. Biotechnology Indus. Org. v. District of Columbia, 496 F.3d 1362, 1373 
(Fed. Cir. 2007) (quoting Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 138 (1988)).  
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. at 1373–74. 
 140. See Part.IV.A, infra. 
 141. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 13731 (2013).  
 142. See Part.III.B.2, infra.  
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addition, states may also choose to bring an action to enjoin a 
pharmaceutical company from violating its regulations regard-
less of whether the delegated agency has brought one. Delegat-
ing responsibility to an agency will help states maintain control 
and authority to enforce their own regulations while leaving 
most of the day-to-day responsibilities under the direction of the 
agency. 
B. THE MODEL STATE STATUTE FOR REGULATING DRAMATIC 
PRICING INCREASES OF PHARMACEUTICALS 
This Section sets forth a model statute designed for states 
to draw upon when implementing their own pharmaceutical 
pricing laws. This proposed Model Act seeks to protect consum-
ers from high pharmaceutical costs by creating a meaningful op-
tion for states to prevent and prohibit unconscionable price in-
creases. 
1. Core Statutory Language 
The District of Columbia’s Prescription Drug Excessive Pric-
ing Act143 provides the foundation for this Model Act, with addi-
tional input from the legal principles discussed in Section III.A, 
supra. Although the District of Columbia legislation was ulti-
mately preempted, it serves as a useful starting point for two 
reasons. First, the Act was the first and only act to directly at-
tempt to reign in soaring drug prices. Second, the opinion in Bi-
otech provides guidance as to why the original Act violated con-
stitutional principles. The Prescription Drug Excessive Pricing 
Act serves as a guide for the Model Act to avoid a similar fate. 
a. The Model Act’s Language 
The suggested Model Act’s main statutory provision is as 
follows: 
It shall be unlawful for any pharmaceutical or biological manufacturer, 
producer, licensee, patent holder, or any other pharmaceutical or medi-
cal-related organization or distributor, excluding a point of sale retail 
seller, to sell, supply for sale, or impose minimum resale requirements 
for a pharmaceutical, biological, or other medical product or service, 
whether drug, device, or otherwise, that results in the product being sold 
in this state for an unconscionably excessive price, or otherwise engage 
in unfair business practices, unless otherwise exempted by this Act.144 
 
 143. D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-4553 (West 2005).  
 144. The Prescription Drug Excessive Pricing Act, the foundation for this 
proposal, read as follows: “It shall be unlawful for any drug manufacturer or 
licensee thereof, excluding a point of sale retail seller, to sell or supply for sale 
 2526 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [102:2497 
 
b. Explanation of the Model Act’s Language 
i.  Pharmaceutical or biological 
The Model Act includes these broad categories of business 
practices in order to capture the full array of organizations a 
state would wish to regulate. By including pharmaceuticals or 
biologicals, a state can ensure that any organization relating to 
pharmaceutical products,145 or any other organization creating 
drugs or other products derived from biological sources,146 must 
abide by this regulation. The Model Act is designed to apply 
broadly in order to prevent any unintentional exceptions to the 
statute’s authority other than those expressly provided by the 
statute. 
ii.  Patent holder 
The addition of the phrase “patent holder” serves the pri-
mary purpose of preventing investment companies from pur-
chasing patent rights, and profiting from those rights while not 
serving any other manufacturing or distribution roles. By includ-
ing patent holders in the Act to regulate unconscionable prices 
or unfair business practices, organizations who hold patents for 
various drugs or devices could not separate that business from 
the manufacturing or distribution process to avoid the reach of 
the Model Act. The language will also prevent companies who 
did not initially invent the product or hold the patent, but sub-
sequently purchased the patent rights from the company who 
did, from claiming the purchase price justifies an increased 
markup of their product.147 
 
or impose minimum resale requirements for a patented prescription drug that 
results in the prescription drug being sold in the District for an excessive price.” 
D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-4553. 
 145. See Pharmaceutical, OXFORD DICTIONARIES, https://en 
.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/pharmaceutical (last visited June 18, 2018) 
(defining “Pharmaceutical” as “[R]elating to medicinal drugs, or their prepara-
tion, use, or sale”).  
 146. See Biological, OXFORD DICTIONARIES, https://en.oxforddictionaries 
.com/definition/biological (last visited June 18, 2018). 
 147. See what this justification looks like in the context of a company not 
being exempt from the Act’s reach in Part.III.B.1. Turing Pharmaceuticals ac-
quisition of the Daraprim patent comes to mind. See Almendrala, supra note 2.  
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iii.  Other pharmaceutical or medical-related products; 
other medical product or service 
This broad language solely intends to ensure the Act cap-
tures every possible situation of unconscionable pricing or unfair 
business practices, whether in relation to drugs, medical devices, 
or some other product or service.148 The Act seeks to broadly pre-
vent and prohibit unconscionable price increases and unfair ac-
tivities in the pharmaceutical industry. 
iv.  Unconscionably excessive price 
The unconscionable language comes from various states’ 
anti-price-gouging laws after emergencies. Several states, in-
cluding Massachusetts, Virginia, and Florida, have these laws 
that bar the sale of goods at “unconscionably high prices” or 
“grossly excessive prices” after emergencies.149 Unconscionabil-
ity is a broad legal principle that can be applied to the regulation 
of pharmaceutical conduct, especially to the extent that raising 
a drug price by 5000% is unconscionable.150 A state may choose 
to use “grossly excessive prices” instead of “unconscionable,” but 
this Note proceeds using the latter.151 
Although a broad term, using unconscionable rather than a 
more unambiguous measurement such as a specific percent-
age152 or dollar amount (for prices, specifically) protects the 
pharmaceutical industry. Pharmaceutical organizations, like 
most businesses, exist to make a profit. Some drugs and devices 
are more profitable than others; indeed, some drugs might even 
 
 148. It is worth pointing out that EpiPen is patented not for Epinephren (the 
substance itself that reduces the impact of an allergic response), but rather for 
the design of its auto-injector. Therefore, the broad language consisting of “med-
ical device or some other product or service” is designed to cover patented phar-
maceutical items like an injector.  
 149. Rapp, supra note 127, at 544. 
 150. See Almendrala, supra note 2.  
 151. For example, Maryland prohibits “price gouging,” defined as “an uncon-
scionable increase in the price of a prescription drug.” See H.B. 631, 2-801(c), 
2017 Reg. Sess. (Md. 2017), http://mgaleg.maryland.gov/2017RS/Chapters_ 
noln/CH_818_hb0631e.pdf. 
 152. The District of Columbia’s Excessive Pricing statute, for example, used 
the following percentage standard: “A prima facie case of excessive pricing shall 
be established where the wholesale price of a patented prescription drug in the 
District is over 30% higher than the comparable price in any high income coun-
try in which the product is protected by patents or other exclusive marketing 
rights.” D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-4554 (West 2005). 
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lose money.153 Research-and-development costs exceeding prof-
its, or a competitor inventing a newer or better drug or device, 
increases the chance of unprofitability. If the Model Act capped 
the price of a device or product at a specific dollar amount, per-
centage of profits or costs, or some other numeric measurement, 
that would unfairly harm pharmaceutical companies who rely on 
pricing certain drugs to a higher-than-desired level—from the 
prospective of the consumer, at least—to cover for losses and 
other operating expenditures. Using unconscionability as the ap-
plicable measurement allows courts to determine on a case-by-
case basis whether the pharmaceutical company set the price of 
its product unreasonably high. The pharmaceutical companies 
could easily refute the charge of unconscionably high pricing by 
demonstrating that recovering their expenses and making a rea-
sonable profit justifies the price they set. 
v.  Otherwise engage in unfair business practices 
This language seeks to keep the scope, reach, and enforce-
ment ability of the Model Act as broad as possible. Because phar-
maceutical companies can harm consumers in ways other than 
directly increasing prices, such as by reducing supply or refusing 
to sell their products in the state,154 this provision would restrict 
a broad range of unfair practices.155 
vi.  Otherwise exempted by this Act 
This language stems from the exemptions found in various 
anti-price-gouging laws. Those exemptions allowed businesses to 
increase their prices for valid business reasons. For example, Ar-
kansas’s anti-price-gouging statute provides that it is not unlaw-
 
 153. See, e.g., Max Nisen, The 10 Best Selling Prescription Drugs in the 
United States, BUS. INSIDER (June 28, 2012), http://www.businessinsider.com/ 
10-best-selling-blockbuster-drugs-2012-6 (“Only a fraction of drugs succeed, but 
a look at how much a blockbuster [drug] is worth makes it clear why companies 
continue to chase them.”). 
 154. See discussion infra Part IV.  
 155. For example, section 5 of the FTC Act defines an unfair practice as: “An 
act or practice is unfair where it: causes or is likely to cause substantial injury 
to consumers; cannot be reasonably avoided by consumers; and is not out-
weighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition.” FEDERAL 
TRADE COMM’N ACT SECTION 5: UNFAIR OR DECEPTIVE ACTS OR PRAC-
TICES, CONSUMER COMPLIANCE HANDBOOK 1 (2016), https://www 
.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/supmanual/cch/ftca.pdf. Such a broad under-
standing of unfair business practices for purposes of this Model Act will ensure 
that a broad range of unfair pharmaceutical behavior is implicated by the Act. 
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ful for a business to increase its pricing if it can prove that in-
creased costs imposed on it by its supplier or increased costs of 
labor or materials caused the increase in their own pricing.156 
The Model Act does not propose to prevent pharmaceutical 
organizations from making a profit or engaging in business prac-
tices as they see fit. Rather, the Act attempts to prevent those 
companies from unjustifiably increasing their prices or engaging 
in other unfair behavior. The Arkansas statute capped price in-
creases after emergencies to ten percent more than the price of 
the product before the emergency, and allowed for adjustment of 
the allowable percentage if it resulted from increased costs.157 
This Note does not propose for a state statute to use hard per-
centages. A pharmaceutical company has a variety of costs, 
risks, and uncertainties that make a hard cap unreasonable. For 
instance, a pharmaceutical distributor may be justified in in-
creasing the price of one if its drugs to cover the costs of research 
and development for a new medication. It may be justified for a 
company to increase the price of its medication or device by 
100%. What may not be justified, however, is an organization 
increasing the price of its drug by 5000%.158 For the same reason 
the Model Act proposes using unconscionability as the measure 
of prohibited behavior, the exemption to allow organizations to 
increase their prices should be broad and require a fact-intensive 
inquiry—by the enforcing agency first, and a court in the event 
of a lawsuit—regarding the reasonableness of the action at issue. 
Exemption language could allow for price increases based on a 
proven surge in research and development costs, increased price 
of resources, or other unexpected expenditures. 
Ultimately, organizations in the pharmaceutical and biolog-
icals industry are businesses designed to turn a profit, and this 
Act does not limit that ability. That said, this Note suggests 
states should include specific language in the exemption section 
excluding the purchase of a patent as a justification for raising 
the cost of the pharmaceutical product or engaging in other un-
fair behavior. Thus, companies such as Turing Pharmaceuticals, 
who merely purchase the rights to a patent but do not engage in 
any research or development of a pharmaceutical, could not 
 
 156. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-88-303 (West 2017). 
 157. Id. 
 158. See Almendrala, supra note 2 (discussing Turing Pharmaceuticals in-
creasing the price of Daraprim, a medication for patients with HIV, by 5000%, 
from $13.50 to $750 per tablet). 
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claim that the expense of purchasing the patent alone justifies 
increasing the price of the drug. 
2. Delegate Authority to State Agency to Monitor and Enforce 
The strongest state UDAP statutes allow for a state agency 
to issue detailed regulations prohibiting specific unfair prac-
tices.159 Similarly, individual states could mandate regulatory 
and enforcement responsibilities to state agencies. These agen-
cies may be better situated to monitor and regulate unconscion-
able and unfair business practices. The authority granted could 
include establishing exemptions allowing for price increases 
based on proper or reasonable business purposes. A state agency 
may have more time, expertise, and resources to monitor price 
increases and recognize when a price increase is justified (i.e. 
reasonable) and when it is not. Furthermore, an agency could be 
better positioned to negotiate with the companies to lower the 
price of their products or refrain from certain behavior—acting 
as their own form of alternative dispute resolution. In fact, states 
could limit the amount or type of remedies and include a require-
ment to exhaust any administrative proceedings; the possibili-
ties of an agency managing the monitoring and enforcement of 
the law are quite broad. Further, because the purpose of the 
Model Act is to allow states to protect their citizens from dra-
matic price increases, having a state agency with some expertise 
in pricing practices enforce the Act would ensure the most ex-
treme cases of unconscionable pricing are being addressed ra-
ther than going after less egregious examples. 
3. Additional Considerations 
This Note posits two additional considerations. First, the 
importance of transparency. California’s Pharmaceutical Cost 
Transparency Act of 2016,160 discussed in Part II.A.1, infra, re-
quires each manufacturer of a prescription drug with a whole-
sale acquisition cost of $10,000 or more to annually file a report 
containing the costs for each qualifying drug with the Office of 
Statewide Health Planning and Development.161 While the ef-
fects of the Act have yet to be seen, it is unclear if transparency 
by itself would provide a sufficient mechanism for states to lower 
 
 159. CARTER, supra note 121, at 11. 
 160. AB-463 Pharmaceutical Cost Transparency Act of 2016, 2015–2016 
Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2016), https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient 
.xhtml?bill_id=201520160AB463. 
 161. Id. 
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drug prices. However, transparency—knowing how much it cost 
a specific company to develop a specific drug—will help the 
states that enact this Note’s Model Act determine what level of 
pricing crosses the line of high to unconscionable. It also ensures 
that the public, and not just the state government or agency, can 
monitor pharmaceutical pricing. 
A second important point to consider is the negotiated prices 
different entities and agencies are paying for drugs. The state of 
Ohio had a ballot initiative planned for November 2017 to vote 
on the Ohio Drug Price Relief Act.162 The Act was designed to 
“require state agencies to pay no more for prescription drugs that 
[sic] the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs.”163 Even though 
the measure was ultimately rejected by the voters, it offered a 
way for states to monitor whether a price for a drug was too high 
by comparing the price to that paid by the U.S. Department of 
Veterans Affairs (VA). Although difficult to achieve in practice 
because the “prices paid by the VA are not public,”164 using sim-
ilar benchmarks and comparisons—such as how much the drug 
is sold for in another state or country, or how much a state’s 
Medicaid program pays for the drug—provides one way for 
states who enact this Note’s proposal to determine when the 
price of a drug becomes unconscionable. While this should not be 
the sole indicator of the reasonableness of a pharmaceutical’s 
price, it is one option for states to consider when enforcing the 
Act. 
IV.  CONCERNS AND CRITICISMS OF STATE 
REGULATION OF PHARMACEUTICAL PRICING   
This Part discusses dangers and critiques of the Model Act’s 
effectiveness. Potential pitfalls include: patent preemption, dis-
cussed in Section A; antitrust preemption, discussed in Section 
B; and Dormant Commerce Clause concerns, discussed in Sec-
tion C. Section D discusses the normative economic concern that 
 
 162. See Julie Carr Smyth & Dan Sewell, Associated Press, Ohio Voters Re-
ject Drug-Price Measure, Back Victims’ Rights, US NEWS (Nov. 8, 2017), https:// 
www.usnews.com/news/best-states/ohio/articles/2017-11-07/ohio-voters-to 
-decide-ballot-issues-mayoral-races (“[The measure] sought to curb prescription 
drug prices paid by the state for prisoners, injured workers and poor people.”). 
 163. Monica Robins, What Is the Ohio Drug Price Relief Act?, WKYC (May 
31, 2017), http://www.wkyc.com/news/health/what-is-the-ohio-drug-price-relief 
-act/444606883. 
 164. Rachel Sachs, State Drug Price Cap Laws: How Do They Work?, HARV. 
PETRIE-FLOM CTR. (Apr. 27, 2016), http://blogs.harvard.edu/billofhealth/2016/ 
04/27/state-drug-price-cap-laws-how-do-they-work. 
 2532 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [102:2497 
 
an organization whose products are being regulated by the Act 
may decide to discontinue selling its products in that state, thus 
negatively impacting the consumers who the statute is trying to 
protect. 
A. PATENT PREEMPTION 
For the sake of protecting inventors’ interests while also 
serving the public good, the Patent Act strikes a balance between 
these competing interests by providing for a limited property 
right and a twenty-year (effective) monopoly on the invented 
technology.165 Patent holders have a right to do as they wish 
with their invention and are therefore free of certain competitive 
constraints;166 they also enjoy certain protections.167 The bene-
fits enjoyed by patent holders raises the question of whether the 
Model Act conflicts with this regulatory scheme and purpose of 
federal patent law. The baseline assumption when answering 
this question is “that the historic police powers of the States [are] 
not to be superseded by the . . . Federal Act unless that [is] the 
clear and manifest purpose of Congress.”168 
Patent preemption can consist of explicit, field, and conflict 
preemption.169 Explicit preemption is likely not a concern here, 
as “federal patent law does not provide explicit preemption.”170 
Further, field preemption, while arguably a closer call, is also 
likely not a concern for the Model Act’s enforcement. Field 
preemption occurs when the scheme of federal regulation—in 
this case, the Patent Act—is “so pervasive as to make reasonable 
 
 165. See Joan E. Schaffner, Patent Preemption Unlocked, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 
1081, 1082 (“Congress enacted the federal patent statute which provides limited 
property protection to discoveries which meet the basic patentability require-
ments of eligibility, utility, novelty, nonobviousness, and disclosure. The con-
gressional scheme carefully balances the need for property-right incentives with 
the need to maintain free access to prior invention.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 166. See Lipski, supra note 120, at 922 (“In other words, the patentee enjoys 
the exclusive right to manufacture, sell, market, or use the invention for a pe-
riod of twenty years.”). 
 167. See Schaffner, supra note 165, at 1081–83 (explaining that the federal 
law, as well as additional state laws, prevent actions by competitors which are 
deemed to be “commercially unethical”—for example, copying the trade design 
of a competitor, engaging in industrial espionage, or breaching confidentiality 
agreements). 
 168. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). 
 169. Ultra-Precision Mfg., Ltd. v. Ford Motor Co., 411 F.3d 1369, 1377 (Fed. 
Cir. 2005). 
 170. Id.; see also Patent Act of 1970, 35 U.S.C. §§ 1–376 (2012). 
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the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supple-
ment it.”171 The Patent Act does not regulate unfair or uncon-
scionable behavior by pharmaceutical companies, nor does it reg-
ulate pricing; it does not grant a right to sell anything.172 Patent 
law grants certain protections and prohibits others from infring-
ing the rights of the patent holder. This Act, on the other hand, 
would prevent pharmaceutical companies from engaging in un-
conscionable behavior, whether through their pricing strategies 
or otherwise. Thus there is a strong argument against the notion 
that field preemption could apply in this case.173 The court’s 
analysis in Biotech supports this conclusion as well.174 
As a result, conflict preemption presents the largest obstacle 
to the Act’s validity.175 Conflict preemption exists where state 
regulation actually conflicts with federal law, or where state reg-
ulation “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execu-
tion of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”176 
 
 171. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 167 
(1989). 
 172. See Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc. v. Cooper Indus., Inc., 131 F.3d 1011, 
1015 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“In fact, the federal patent laws do not create any affirm-
ative right to make, use, or sell anything.”); Herman v. Youngstown Car Mfg. 
Co., 191 F. 579, 584 (6th Cir. 1911) (“A patent is not the grant of a right to make 
or use or sell. It does not, directly or indirectly, imply any such right. It grants 
only the right to exclude others.”). 
 173. See generally CardioVention, Inc. v. Medtronic, Inc., 430 F.Supp. 933, 
939 (2006) (finding it “evident that federal patent law and state unfair compe-
tition claims occupy different fields”). If Congress had truly meant to occupy the 
entire field of patent rights, including pricing, to the exclusion of states, it would 
have, or should have, stated so in the Patent Act and subsequent legislative 
additions. 
 174. The court decided the case using a conflict preemption analysis, and 
found that the “Act’s operation stands largely—indeed, exclusively—within the 
scope of the patent laws, and its effect is to shift the benefits of a patented in-
vention from inventors to consumers.” Biotechnology Indus. Org. v. District of 
Columbia, 496 F.3d 1362, 1373–74 (2007). 
 175. It should be noted that impossibility preemption—“the principle that 
state law cannot require a drug manufacturer to take an act that the drug’s 
federal approval precludes”—does not apply here, as the Model Act does not 
require the manufacturer to engage in any behavior whatsoever and does not 
contravene any FDA regulations or grants. See Mut. Pharm. Co., Inc. v. Bart-
lett, 133 S. Ct. 2466 (2013) (holding that a New Hampshire law requiring drug 
manufacturers to make changes to warning labels was preempted by federal 
law); Adam E. Lyons, Federal Preemption Precludes Challenge to FDA-Approved 
Drug, LITIG. NEWS (Apr. 27, 2016), https://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/ 
litigationnews/mobile/article-preemption-fda.html. 
 176. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). 
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On its face, the Act does not conflict with federal law.177 As 
stated, patent law protects certain property rights and prevents 
infringement of those rights. The Model Act, on the other hand, 
does not restrict property rights or infringe on the patent holder. 
But does the Model Act stand as an obstacle to the execution of 
patent law? The court in Biotech said the District of Columbia’s 
Excessive Pricing Act, which inspires the Model Act, did. The 
court determined that the District of Columbia legislation was 
“in no way general, affecting only patented products” and “ap-
plie[d] only to patented drugs,” which the court interpreted as 
the District of Columbia attempting to “change federal patent 
policy within its borders” contrary to “the goals established by 
Congress in the patent laws.”178 
There are several key distinctions between the Model Act 
and the District of Columbia’s Excessive Pricing Statute that 
support the conclusion that the Model Act is not preempted by 
patent law. First, the Model Act regulates pharmaceutical com-
panies’ behavior in general; it does not restrict enforcement of 
the Act to only drug prices. Second, the Act does not limit en-
forcement to actions that relate only to drugs or medications, but 
any actions and products. Third, the Act does not limit enforce-
ment to only patented products. Fourth, the Excessive Pricing 
Act attempted to compare the prices of patented drugs in other 
countries with the price of the drug in the United States in order 
to determine the appropriate price of the drug.179 As a result, 
under the Biotech reasoning, this Model Act does not conflict 
 
 177. See Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 609 (2004) (finding that facial 
challenges, in the strictest sense, are challenges that allege no application of 
the statute is constitutional) (citation omitted); Alex Kreit, Making Sense of Fa-
cial and As-Applied Challenges, 18 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 657, 657 (2010) 
(“A facial attack is typically described as one where no application of the statute 
would be constitutional.”). 
 178. Biotechnology, 496 F.3d at 1373–74. 
 179. Biotechnology Indus. Org. v. District of Columbia, 505 F.3d 1343, 1347 
(Fed. Cir. 2007) (Gajarsa, J., concurring). 
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with federal patent law.180 The Model Act further does not con-
flict with the line of reasoning under Bonito Boats,181 University 
of Colorado,182 or Aronson.183 
A hurdle for the Model Act is an as-applied challenge to the 
Act’s constitutionality.184 A pharmaceutical company whose pa-
tented drug is implicated by the Act may argue that the Act lim-
its their rights and abilities granted by federal patent law and is 
therefore unconstitutional as applied to them. The court in Ar-
onson found that  
[T]he purposes of the federal patent system [are] to foster and reward 
invention; [ ] to promote disclosure of inventions, stimulate further in-
novation, and permit the public to practice the invention once the pa-
tent expires; and [] to assure that ideas in the public domain remain 
there for the free use of the public.185 
The argument against the Act based on these principles is 
that prohibiting unconscionable conduct, which could include 
dramatic price increases under the Model Act, conflicts with the 
patent system’s purpose of fostering and rewarding inventions 
 
 180. In sum, because the Model Act applies broadly to all pharmaceutical 
companies and manufacturers, and is not limited to just patented drugs, there 
are many applications of the statute that would be constitutional. For example, 
if after a state emergency the manufacturer of a product that is not patent pro-
tected dramatically and unjustifiably increases the prices of its products, the 
State could bring an action against the manufacturer for unfair business prac-
tices and unconscionably setting its prices. The legality of such an act is without 
question, as exemplified by various state anti-price-gouging statutes. See supra 
Part III.A.2. Thus it is likely a facial challenge would fail. 
 181. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 142 
(1989) (“By offering patent-like protection for ideas deemed unprotected under 
the federal patent scheme, the Florida statute conflicts with the ‘strong federal 
policy favoring free competition in ideas which do not merit patent protection.’” 
(citing Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 693, 656 (1969))). 
 182. See Univ. of Colo. Found., Inc. v. Am. Cynamid Co., 342 F.3d 1298, 1307 
(Fed. Cir. 2003) (“[T]he Doctors’ claim of unjust enrichment does not undermine 
the purposes of the federal patent scheme: the Doctors can collect the fruits of 
their research, which fosters both specific and general incentives to innovate, 
while their reformulations stimulate further innovation; at the same time, no 
information in the public domain is denied free circulation. The unjust enrich-
ment claim does not prevent the public from using these ideas.”). 
 183. See Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979) (“En-
forcement of Quick Point’s agreement with Mrs. Aronson is not inconsistent 
with any [patent law] aims. Permitting inventors to make enforceable agree-
ments licensing the use of their inventions in return for royalties provides an 
additional incentive to invention.”). 
 184. See Kreit, supra note 177 (“Courts define an as-applied challenge as one 
‘under which the plaintiff argues that a statute, even though generally consti-
tutional, operates unconstitutionally as to him or her because of the plaintiff ’s 
particular circumstances.’” (footnote omitted)). 
 185. Aronson, 440 U.S. at 257. 
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by limiting the amount of economic return a company can make 
from its development of a new drug or device. Congress allowed 
patent holders to exclude competitors from the market for a lim-
ited time and therefore effectively allowed the patent holders to 
price their products however they deemed fit. Restricting drug 
prices contradicts that right given by Congress and serves as a 
disincentive to engage in the risks and costs of developing a new 
drug.186 However, the Model Act does not directly regulate pa-
tented pharmaceutical prices, nor does it conflict with a com-
pany’s ability to set and increase the price it sells its product for. 
Instead, the Act regulates unconscionable behavior by pharma-
ceutical companies in general. Once behavior becomes uncon-
scionable, it is up to the company to correct it back to less-than-
unconscionable levels. What that means in any given situation 
will depend on the facts and what behavior is deemed uncon-
scionable or unfair; and because this is a flexible standard de-
signed to adjust to changing circumstances, there is little risk of 
arbitrary application in the same way that might happen with a 
more rigid standard. The Act does not stand as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment and execution of federal patent law to exclude 
competitors for a period of twenty years, nor does it deprive the 
patent holder of any other rights granted by their patent.187 The 
Act entirely permits companies to make a profit and to otherwise 
engage in business unimpeded—subject to otherwise applicable 
law. 
Further, the Model Act does not conflict with the Aronson 
principle that state regulations of patented products should not 
stifle new drug innovation. The Model Act does not conflict with 
a pharmaceutical company’s development efforts or profit reali-
zation through the right to exclude others from the marketplace. 
 
 186. See, e.g., King Instruments Corp. v. Perego, 65 F.3d 941, 950 (Fed. Cir. 
1995) (“[T]he Patent Act creates an incentive for innovation. The economic re-
wards during the period of exclusivity are the carrot. The patent owner expends 
resources in expectation of receiving this reward. Upon grant of the patent, the 
only limitation on the size of the carrot should be the dictates of the market-
place.”). The issue with this characterization of patent rights, however, is that 
it completely ignores the reality of how pharmaceutical patents operate. The 
Cambridge Dictionary defines marketplace as “the system of buying and selling 
in competitive conditions.” Marketplace, CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY, http:// 
dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/marketplace (last visited June 
18, 2018). There are no dictates of the marketplace for pharmaceutical pa-
tents—all competitors are excluded for a period of time. The carrot doesn’t en-
gage in a system of buying and selling in competitive conditions; it is impossible 
for that to occur. 
 187. King Instruments Corp., 65 F.3d at 950.  
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Aronson also determined that one of the purposes of the Patent 
Act is “foster[ing] and reward[ing] invention[s].”188 The Model 
Act does not impede the fostering and rewarding of inventions, 
as only companies that set their prices at unconscionably high 
levels without justification will be under the purview of the Act. 
Analogously, the Act’s limitation on pricing does not conflict with 
the rewards of developing a new drug in the same way that rent 
control, regulations on the quality of food items, and caps on the 
price of electricity do not impede the rewards of conducting busi-
ness in those fields; profits are still earned.189 Further, because 
the Act does not propose setting a specified cap on the price of a 
product, but rather encourages an analysis of the justification of 
the price on a case-by-case basis, a pharmaceutical organization 
is always “fostered and rewarded” for its new invention until the 
point in time when its actions become unconscionable. Nothing 
in federal patent law promotes or immunizes a company from 
behaving unconscionably.190 The Model Act does not prohibit 
profiting, but rather prohibits unfair behavior or setting uncon-
scionable prices. The Model Act does not conflict with federal pa-
tent law.191 
 
 188. Aronson, 440 U.S. at 262. 
 189. An argument against price controls is that they can actually lead to 
higher prices because the ceilings can promote collusion among suppliers who 
would be competitors. But that is not a concern in the context of pharmaceuti-
cals, as the industry generally lacks competition as a result of patent protection, 
and therefore competitors generally cannot collude with one another; but there 
is one exception to this general principle. Even if generic drugs can compete 
with brand names drugs, brand-name companies often engage in the practice of 
reverse payments in order to maintain their effective monopoly for longer than 
twenty years, something prohibited by the Hatch-Waxman Act. See the discus-
sion of reverse payments in Part I.C. For more information on reverse payments 
and its impact on generic drugs entering the market, see Audra J. Passinault, 
A Prescription for the Future: Reverse-Payment Settlements in the Wake of FTC 
v. Actavis Pharmaceuticals, 29 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 549 
(2015). Thus controlling unconscionable prices in the pharmaceutical field will 
not lead to collusion, as its either not possible—there is no competition—or it is 
already prohibited by Hatch-Waxman. 
 190. See Herman v. Youngstown Car Mfg. Co., 191 F. 579, 584 (6th Cir. 1911) 
(“A patent is not the grant of a right to make or use or sell. It does not, directly 
or indirectly, imply any such right. It grants only the right to exclude others.”). 
 191. After finding the District of Columbia’s Excessive Price Act was 
preempted by patent law and denying an en banc rehearing, a judge agreeing 
with the legal conclusions reached by the majority acknowledged: 
This does not mean that any state regulation that affects a patentee’s 
profits so undermines the goals of the patent system as to be 
preempted. It is well established that states can generally regulate pa-
tented products as part of their general exercise of police powers with-
out preemption, even if this regulation incidentally affects the profits 
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B. ANTITRUST PREEMPTION 
Congress passed the Sherman Act in 1890 as a “comprehen-
sive charter of economic liberty aimed at preserving free and un-
fettered competition as the rule of trade.”192 In addition, the FTC 
Act and the Clayton Act constitute the antitrust laws. The Sher-
man Act outlaws every conspiracy in restraint of trade and any 
attempted monopolization, while the FTC Act bans unfair meth-
ods of competition.193 The Clayton Act further bans conduct that 
lessens competition.194 
In interpreting the Model Act to discern preemption by an-
titrust law, a court would first decide if the Model Act “mandates 
or authorizes conduct that necessarily constitutes a violation of 
those laws in all cases, or if it places irresistible pressure on a 
private party to violate the antitrust laws in order to comply with 
the statute.”195 The Model Act does not violate any of these prin-
ciples, and therefore avoids antitrust preemption. First, the 
Model Act does not mandate or authorize conduct that violates 
antitrust law. The Model Act does not promote a monopoly, nor 
does it incentivize monopolistic behavior. Rather, the Model Act 
forbids unconscionable behavior by pharmaceutical companies. 
Second, the Model Act does not place pressure on pharmaceuti-
cal companies to violate antitrust law. The Model Act, rather, 
pressures pharmaceutical companies to engage in more reason-
 
a patentee gains from its patent . . . . But that states have broad leeway 
to regulate patented products does not mean that they have unlimited 
ability to do so in situations in which the regulation significantly and 
directly impedes Congress’s purpose in providing the federal patent 
right. 
Biotechnology Indus. Org. v. District of Columbia, 505 F.3d 1343, 1346 n.1 (Fed. 
Cir. 2007) (Gajarsa, J., concurring). The judge further went on to state that “[i]n 
my view, a price discrimination provision presents no conflict with the purpose 
of the federal patent law.” Id. at 1349. 
 192. The Antitrust Laws, Subsection in Guide to Antitrust Laws, FTC, 
https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/ 
antitrust-laws (last visited June 18, 2018).  
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. 
 195. Rice v. Norman Williams Co., 458 U.S. 654, 661 (1982) (“Such condem-
nation will follow under § 1 of the Sherman Act when the conduct contemplated 
by the statute is in all cases a per se violation. If the activity addressed by the 
statute does not fall into that category, and therefore must be analyzed under 
the rule of reason, the statute cannot be condemned in the abstract . . . . Analy-
sis under the rule of reason requires an examination of the circumstances un-
derlying a particular economic practice, and therefore does not lend itself to a 
conclusion that a statute is facially inconsistent with federal antitrust laws.”). 
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able behavior—engage in behavior that does not lead to uncon-
scionable prices or other unfair behavior. This Act serves as a 
complement to antitrust law, not as an impediment. 
C. DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE CONCERNS 
The power to regulate interstate commerce is exclusively 
vested in Congress196 through the Commerce Clause.197 Accord-
ing to the seminal Limbach case, the “Commerce Clause not only 
grants Congress the authority to regulate commerce among the 
States, but also directly limits the power of the States to discrim-
inate against interstate commerce.”198 This “reversed” facet of 
the Commerce Clause, better known as Dormant Commerce 
Clause, “prohibits economic protectionism—that is, regulatory 
measures designed to benefit in-state economic interests by bur-
dening out-of-state competitors.”199 As a result, “state statutes 
that clearly discriminate against interstate commerce are rou-
tinely struck down, unless the discrimination is demonstrably 
justified by a valid factor unrelated to economic protection-
ism.”200 
1. Why the Dormant Commerce Clause Does Not Prohibit the 
Model Act 
In Lambach, the Supreme Court found that the state statute 
at issue deprived “certain products of generally available benefi-
cial tax treatment because they [were] made in certain other 
States, and thus on its face [appeared] to violate the cardinal 
requirement of nondiscrimination.”201 In rejecting the appel-
lant’s “reciprocity”202 argument—essentially “encouraging” 
 
 196. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 180 (1824). 
 197. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (stating that Congress shall have power 
“[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, 
and with the Indian Tribes”). 
 198. New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 273 (1988) (citations 
omitted). 
 199. Id. (citations omitted). 
 200. Id. at 274. 
 201. Id. 
 202. The appellants argued that 
[T]he availability of the tax credit to some out-of-state manufacturers 
(those in States that give tax advantages to Ohio-produced ethanol) 
shows that the Ohio provision, far from discriminating against inter-
state commerce, is likely to promote it, by encouraging other States to 
enact similar tax advantages that will spur the interstate sale of etha-
nol. Id. 
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other states to enact a similar piece of legislation—the Court de-
termined that states “may not use the threat of economic isola-
tion as a weapon to force sister States to enter into even a desir-
able reciprocity agreement.”203 In contrast, the Model Act does 
not include such a reciprocity facet or anything resembling an 
encouragement for other states to enact similar legislation. The 
Model Act does not discriminate between products from pharma-
ceutical companies based on their location, whether inside or 
outside of the state. Instead, the Model Act applies to all phar-
maceutical companies that engage in unfair practices or uncon-
scionable pricing within the state. Further, the Model Act does 
not create minimum pricing limitations,204 reward certain phar-
maceutical companies while discriminating against others, or 
create an economic isolation that forces other states to enact sim-
ilar policies to stay competitive through pricing. Instead, the 
Model Act has the exact opposite result: for pharmaceutical com-
panies, it may make other states that do not enact the Model Act, 
and therefore have no restrictions on unconscionable prices or 
other unfair behavior, appear more favorable for business oper-
ations and sales. There is no disparity of treatment that impli-
cates the reciprocity principle under the Dormant Commerce 
Clause line of cases.205 
Furthermore, the concern of economic protectionism is also 
not implicated by the Model Act.206 The Model Act does not dis-
criminate between different companies within the pharmaceuti-
cal industry; it treats them all the same, and only limits certain 
conduct. It is not illegal to require certain industries to engage 
 
 203. Id. (citations omitted).  
 204. See Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 528 (1935) (“It is a very 
different thing to establish a wage scale or a scale of prices for use in other 
states, and to bar the sale of the products, whether in the original packages or 
in others, unless the scale has been observed.”). 
 205. See Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 957 (1982) 
(holding that “the reciprocity provision operates as an explicit barrier to com-
merce between the two States”); Hunt v. Wash. Apple Advert. Comm’n, 432 U.S 
333, 349–51 (1977) (invalidating a North Carolina statute that did not exclude 
apples from other states but imposed additional costs upon Washington sellers 
and deprived them of their commercial advantage); Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. 
Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366, 379 (1976) (holding that “Mississippi may not use the 
threat of economic isolation as a weapon to force sister States to enter into even 
a desirable reciprocity agreement”); Baldwin, 294 U.S. at 527 (finding that the 
New York law was “an economic barrier against competition” that was “equiva-
lent to a rampart of customs duties”).  
 206. See Limbach, 486 U.S. at 273 (“[E]conomic protectionism—that is, reg-
ulatory measures designed to benefit in-state economic interests by burdening 
out-of-state competitors.” (citations omitted)). 
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in, or prohibit from doing, certain practices that other industries 
are not prohibited from engaging in.207 The fact that pharmaceu-
tical companies may be held to a different standard—in the form 
of a prohibition on unfair practices and unconscionable prices—
than companies within other, distinct industries, does not bene-
fit in-state economic interests by burdening out-of-state compet-
itors. The competitors in the pharmaceutical industry are the 
pharmaceutical companies themselves—and patent holders—
who would all be regulated by the Model Act. In-state pharma-
ceutical companies are not treated differently than out-of-state 
companies for purposes of the Model Act. 
2. The Model Act Advances Local Purposes in the Absence of 
Reasonable Alternatives 
Even if a court would find that the Model Act is discrimina-
tory by being economically protectionist, the Model Act still does 
not violate the Dormant Commerce Clause. Although a heavy 
burden,208 the case law “leave[s] open the possibility that a State 
may validate a statute that discriminates against interstate 
commerce by showing that it advances a legitimate local purpose 
that cannot be adequately served by reasonable nondiscrimina-
tory alternatives.”209 The proponent of the state law must also 
show “whether the challenged statute regulates evenhandedly 
with only ‘incidental’ effects on interstate commerce, or discrim-
inates against interstate commerce either on its face or in prac-
tical effect.”210 The Court in Lambach did not agree with appel-
lant’s characterization of the act in question as being health-
related. Rather, the Court found that “[i]t could not be clearer 
that health is not the purpose of the provision, but is merely an 
occasional and accidental effect of achieving what is its purpose, 
favorable tax treatment for Ohio-produced ethanol.”211 In con-
trast, the Model Act does not hide its intent or purpose; it is to 
regulate unfair practices and unconscionable prices. It is de-
signed to protect the wellbeing of consumers within the state by 
 
 207. For example, telemarketers can be prohibited from calling consumers 
through use of the FTC’s do-not-call list, while nonprofit and political organiza-
tions do not have such a restriction. See Mainstream Market. Servs., Inc. v. Fed. 
Trade Comm’n, 358 F.3d 1228 (10th Cir. 2004). 
 208. See Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978) (“[W]here sim-
ple economic protectionism is effected by state legislation, a virtually per se rule 
of invalidity has been erected.”). 
 209. Limbach, 486 U.S. at 278 (citations omitted). 
 210. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979). 
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offering protections against highly-priced pharmaceutical prod-
ucts and other unfair behavior. The Act certainly advances a lo-
cal purpose, as it would apply to and protect residents of the 
state itself. 
Further, the interests the Act is designed to protect cannot 
be adequately served by reasonable nondiscriminatory alterna-
tives. As discussed above,212 federal patent law provides strong 
exclusionary protections to patent holders that effectively allows 
them to price their products at exorbitant levels. To date, the 
federal government has refused to provide any sort of relief for 
the decades-long practice of dramatic pharmaceutical price in-
creases. States that have tried to enact meaningful policy have 
met staunch resistance in the courts. Consumers who rely on 
pharmaceuticals that have increased 5000% in price need some 
protection.213 To date, this Model Act is the only thing that can 
provide that protection, as it serves a local purpose that no other 
adequate measure could achieve. 
Finally, at worst, this Act burdens interstate transactions 
only incidentally. The Act does not prohibit engaging in any com-
merce, business, or trade.214 The Act does not prevent certain 
actions that do not meet a set list of criteria. Further, the Model 
Act does not impose a burden on trade excessive in relation to 
the local benefits.215 Under the Model Act, pharmaceutical com-
panies can price their products, or engage in any other behavior, 
so long as it is not unconscionable or unfair—subject to other 
U.S. laws. Consumers, on the other hand, are protected from un-
conscionable price increases or other unfair behavior. Protecting 
the economic wellbeing of consumers as well as providing a fairer 
opportunity for them to access life-saving medications certainly 
outweighs the burdens imposed on pharmaceutical companies. 
 
 212. See supra Part I.B.1. 
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D. ECONOMIC REALITIES OF PROHIBITING UNCONSCIONABLE 
PHARMACEUTICAL PRACTICES 
A major concern with the Model Act’s regulation of pharma-
ceutical behavior, including restricting unconscionable prices, 
centers around the possibility that a pharmaceutical company 
could decide to discontinue selling its regulated product in that 
state, thus penalizing the consumers more than they had been 
without the Act’s protections. While the prospect of pharmaceu-
tical companies pulling their products off the shelves in a state 
that enacts the Model Act is concerning, there are two responses 
to this problem. 
First, it is important to recognize that pharmaceutical com-
panies’ actions or prices will only be impacted if a court finds 
their practices to be unfair or their prices unconscionable. A 
court would only find those situations to occur—and specifically, 
that the price is unconscionable—if the pharmaceutical company 
cannot provide any rationally-justified reasons why the price of 
the medication or device that prompted the application of the 
Model Act needs to be at the level the company set it at. For dis-
continuation to become an actual threat, a court would need to 
determine that the company’s actions were unconscionable—an 
admittedly difficult standard to prove—despite the pharmaceu-
tical company’s ability to prove its justifiableness as it relates to 
its internal operations and needs; it does not have to compare its 
pricing to what is a “normal” price for a similar medication, nor 
is the pricing limited to a certain, arguably arbitrary percent-
age.216 
Second, it is also important to remember that the Model Act 
does not seek to punish pharmaceutical companies for attempt-
ing to make a profit. Rather, the Model Act attempts to reign in 
unjustifiable, soaring pharmaceutical prices and regulate other 
unfair behavior. Again, the Model Act proposes a loose standard 
for high prices; the Act does not limit pricing by industry stand-
ards or a set percentage. Drug development and implementation 
is an expensive and risky endeavor, and pharmaceutical compa-
nies may rely on certain “profit making” medications to replen-
ish their profits from other failed or less profitable ventures.217 
As a result, it makes sense that some products may cost more 
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because companies rely on them for profits. That said, this reli-
ance itself does not justify selling the product at any price. It 
does not justify increasing the cost of medication 5000% when 
the company itself did not incur the costs of researching and de-
veloping the product, but rather bought patent rights from the 
organization that did.218 A pharmaceutical company or patent 
holder can make a profit, and the Act does not intend to hinder 
that ability. However, the Act does not condone an organization 
pricing its products at unconscionable levels. Ultimately, if the 
pharmaceutical organization can justify its pricing decisions, 
then it can continue its practices. 
However, a pharmaceutical company may still decide to pull 
its products from a state after being found to have engaged in 
unfair practices or unconscionably pricing its products. There 
are several responses to that event. First, the public would likely 
respond swiftly and with force. Public sentiment and collective 
action can influence business decisions and create social move-
ments. If the public collectively decides to boycott a pharmaceu-
tical company that puts peoples’ lives in danger by refusing to 
sell a product at a less than unconscionable price, that could 
force the company to continue selling in the state. Profits matter, 
and hurting the bottom line draws attention. Second, even if the 
company refuses to continue selling its products, public outcry 
may finally persuade Congress to enact some sort of meaningful 
federal legislation to protect consumers from unfair acts and un-
conscionable pricing. If consumers put enough pressure on poli-
ticians, some change may come. 
  CONCLUSION   
Dramatic price increases in pharmaceutical products is not 
a new phenomenon. For decades, pharmaceutical companies 
have gouged consumers’ pocketbooks by raising the prices of 
pharmaceuticals with no justifiable explanation. The federal 
government has been unable or unwilling to enact any meaning-
ful legislation, and states that have tried to prohibit this behav-
ior have found their efforts preempted by federal patent law. 
This Note proposes that states can regulate pharmaceutical 
conduct, including pricing, by enacting a statute similar to the 
Model Act provided herein. States need to be sure to keep their 
statutes general enough to avoid preemption, and must conduct 
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reasonable investigations of pharmaceutical companies’ reasons 
for price increases, to effectively and fairly regulate unconscion-
able pricing and other unjust behavior. As expressed throughout 
this Note, this Model Act does not attempt to impinge on fair 
profit-making activities of pharmaceutical companies. Rather, 
this Note proposes that the law should no longer promote and 
tolerate unnecessary and unconscionable price increases of phar-
maceutical products. 
